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I.
INTRODUCTION
Copyright law has been part of international law since the
end of the nineteenth century, when the Berne Convention, one
of the first precursors of globalization, came into force in 1886.
But copyright law has specifically undergone a dramatic change in
the past decade; it no longer strives toward the “encouragement of
learning,” in the words of the English Statute of Anne (1709), or
toward “promoting the progress of science,” in the words of the
United States Constitution.
Now, more than ever before,
copyright serves the purpose of trade.
A decade ago, the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations
created the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, within the
framework of the WTO, the Trade Related Agreement on
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was devised.1 Copyright
scholar David Nimmer wrote thereafter that, “[c]opyright has now
entered the world of international trade,” and declared the “end
of copyright law.”2
Copyright, of course, did not disappear with the advent of the
WTO and TRIPS, but it did change dramatically. The new
copyright regime is no longer a law of the public and for the
public, but rather, a law of business, for businessmen and
investors. We now have a global copyright (G©) regime. This is a
shift in the essence of copyright law, which goes hand in hand with
the ongoing commodification of information and the dramatic
expansion of copyright law that has taken place in developed
countries over the past decade.3 These two processes, the
commodification of information and the expansion of copyright,
work to reinforce each other.
Old copyright law was a delicate and complex balance of the
interests and rights of authors (past, current and future), and the
interests and rights of users and the public in general. The
globalization of copyright law and its shift from “the field of
cultural production”4 to that of trade has reshuffled the cards
(including the trumps, i.e., the legal rights)5 and destabilized
1 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
2 See David Nimmer, The End of Copyright Law, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1386 (1995)
(discussing the impact of the TRIPS agreement on U.S. copyright law). See also id. at 1412
(explaining that “copyright now serves as an adjunct of trade.”).
3 See EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); THE
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds.,
2002).
4 PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION (1993).
5 Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron
ed., 1984). The term “trump” is taken from Dworkin. Id.
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previous balances. In light of concerns that the old foundations of
copyright law will collapse under the heavy weight of global forces,
this shift to a trade-focused understanding of copyright law
requires a reevaluation of at least some of those foundations. This
article addresses the concern that due to the globalization of
copyright, local culture, access to information, access to
knowledge, freedom of research, and free speech in general will
not be accorded appropriate importance in the face of expanding
copyright.
This article attempts to trace the impact globalization has had
on copyright law as it has shifted toward becoming a matter of
trade. This article examines the intersection of copyright law and
free speech. The intersection of copyright law and free speech is
important in itself, but it also provides a jumping-off point for an
exploration of copyright in general.6
The thesis of this article is composed of two sub-arguments
and a third that ties the two sub-arguments together. The first
argument is a normative evaluation of G© law. Several scholars
documented and critically evaluated the process by which copyright
became global over the past decade.7 They described in great
6 Much of the critical discourse on copyright and free speech in recent years, in
academia and elsewhere, has retained its focus and remained within the contours of
copyright law – only occasionally turning to other legal branches, such as antitrust law.
The critical view on the commodification of information, or the “public domain” project,
for example, remains a useful lens through which the concerns that arise in the face of
the expansion of copyright law can be conceptualized.
See, e.g., Conference,
Commodification
of
Information,
HAIFA
LAW
FACULTY,
http://law.haifa.ac.il/events/event_sites/info-comm/abstact.htm (1999); Conference,
Conference
on
the
Public
Domain,
DUKE
LAW
SCHOOL,
http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers.html (2001).
Both conferences resulted in
extensive scholarship. Recently, there has been a fresh attempt to reframe the concerns
in a positive agenda, of “access to knowledge”, see Conference, Access to Knowledge, YALE
LAW SCHOOL, http://research.yale.edu/isp/eventsa2k.html (2006). These are intriguing
and powerful ideas which have the potential to provide overarching themes and an
alternative to the property-driven narrative which plagues much of the current discourse
on copyright law. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004) (describing the
“property narrative”).
On a global level, the reframed idea is the “development agenda.” A2K and the
development agenda have the power to be proactive, in that they not only criticize the
disadvantages of the contemporary (global) copyright regime, but also outline a positive
agenda. See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2823 (2006) (suggesting that a global intellectual property regime
should include a principle of substantive equality).
At this point, the ideas of A2K and the Development Agenda still require
crystallization and refinement. Hence, focusing on free speech jurisprudence as the
counter-measure of the expansion of copyright law has the benefits of addressing a
familiar idea, especially within the North’s liberal democracies.
7 See, e.g., Peter Drahos, Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and
Dialogue, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND
DEVELOPMENT 161 (Peter Drahos and Ruth Mayne, eds., 2002) [hereinafter Negotiating];
NOREENA HERTZ, THE SILENT TAKEOVER – GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND THE DEATH OF
DEMOCRACY (2001); Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and the Sources of (International)
Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 585 (2001); MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE
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detail how a few mega-corporations captured international
organizations and managed to channel their business models
through international treaties, provisions of which would later be
incorporated into national legal systems.8 This article focuses not
on the process of G© but on evaluating the outcome thereof, i.e.,
the nature of G©. This examination of G© reveals that currently
copyright reflects an ideology of trade, and that copyright law has
been detached from its previously underlying philosophies.
“Ideology of trade” refers to a capitalistic view that elevates the
free market and its efficient functioning to the top priority,
making it the single most important social norm that trumps all
other interests and recruits them to serve its end.
The second argument applies the framework of G© to a
specific but fundamental area of copyright law: the conflict that
exists (or does not, depending upon whom you ask) between
copyright law and free speech. The argument notes a peculiar
discrepancy: while copyright has become global, free speech
jurisprudence has remained local, and hence, different from place
to place.9 The result is that the answers given to the alleged
copyright-speech conflict in one place (that copyright is the
engine of free speech, for example) do not necessarily fit in other
places.10 Accordingly, Part II of this article offers a glance into the
political and social phenomena of globalization in general, and
then focuses on intellectual property law and copyright law in
particular. Part II also introduces the concept of GloCalization,
i.e., the fusion of the global and the local.
Part III is devoted to surveying the status of speech – and the
status of freedom of speech – around the globe. Despite attempts
to create an international principle of free speech, there is no
DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 91
(1998).
8 See HERTZ, supra note 7.
9 Free speech is not only a matter of law. Rather, it is a matter of political and
cultural tradition. A country’s free speech principle is usually the result of an ongoing
dialectical process where the local culture and the law influence and shape each other.
This issue is further elaborated in Part III, infra.
10 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss observed this asymmetry on a wider scale, stating that
core protections for users are, on the whole, not found in intellectual property
laws themselves, but rather in other law or, more obscurely, embedded in the
structure of the legal regime as a whole. Indeed, for developing countries, this
is an important part of the problem. Because these states lack the background
rules that developed countries take for granted, the bases for limiting the scope
of rights, or for implying user protections into law, are largely absent.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21,
30 (2004) [hereinafter TRIPS-Round II].
I focus on one such “external” law, namely free speech law. See also Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property Law and the Public
Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 431, 448 (2004) (making a similar argument in the
context of patent law and TRIPS).
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such unified principle. Free speech remains a local matter, with
free speech jurisprudence and the “tradition” of free speech
varying from one jurisdiction to another. Furthermore, free
speech jurisprudence is contingent upon a country’s history,
culture, legal system, and current national agenda. A comparison
of the level of free speech and the economic status of WTO
members reveals that there is a direct correlation between the
level of economic development (free trade) and that of free
speech. Part III further concludes that freedom of speech is
unlikely to be subject to a global regime in the near future.
Part IV addresses the alleged conflict between copyright law
and free speech and the various responses offered by courts in
developed countries that attempt to explain why the conflict is
unproblematic. The judicial responses usually state either that
there is no such conflict, or that the conflict has been satisfactorily
addressed. Equipped with the conclusions from the previous Parts
about the nature of G© and the local nature of free speech, this
Part will take the copyright law/free speech conflict to the global
level. It concludes that in a world of G© and local speech, the
conflict between property limitations on the use of creative works
on the one hand and the freedom to use these works to enhance
creativity, culture, and democratic participation on the other
hand, is better understood as a case of GloCalization. The
copyright/speech conflict is both legal and political, and it
enables the global norms of trade to collide with local culture.
When copyright law is imposed upon countries without a strong
tradition of free speech, access to information is limited, as is the
use of such information, and the as the formation of new speech.
In other words, the trade benefits to the North come at the
expense of freedom in the South.11 The lessons derived from the
comparison of free trade and free speech emphasize the
inappropriateness of the North’s treatment of the South.
It is important to realize that one size (copyright) does not fit
all (countries). Despite the undisputed need for harmonization of
copyright law on a global scale, the expansion of copyright law
should be softened, and copyright should be redirected to its
original productive and benevolent goal: the promotion of
11 The terms North and South have come to refer to the industrialized, developed
countries, and low-income, developing and less developed countries, respectively. The
vertical description based on an economic criterion has replaced the horizontal West-East
division, based on political and ideological criteria, which dominated political discourse
during the Cold War. See Fernando Henrique Cardoso, North-South Relations in the Present
Context: A New Dependency?, in THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY IN THE INFORMATION AGE:
REFLECTIONS ON OUR CHANGING WORLD 149, 156 (Martin Carnoy, Stephen S. Cohen &
Fernando Henrique Cardoso eds., 1993) (describing the shift from the East-West polarity
to the North-South polarity).
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culture. Global institutions, such as the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) and the WTO, should also
recognize the impact that G© has had on opportunities for
speech, and act accordingly. The Development Agenda currently on
WIPO’s table is a good step in this direction.12
II. THE NEW WORLD IP ORDER
A. Globalization
Globalization has become a buzzword in recent years,
especially since the Battle of Seattle in 1999,13 though this
economic, political, and cultural phenomenon started long
before. A lot of water has passed under the bridge since Marshall
McLuhan wrote about the global village in 1964.14 Much was
written about the pros and cons of globalization in various
disciplines. The criticisms of globalization stem from social and
economic concerns and political views, and is driven by fear of
environmental effects, violations of human rights, and other
concerns. Support for globalization is based on liberal ideologies,
some theories of macro-economics, and a belief that capitalism
and globalization can lead to freedom and liberty. This Part
begins by presenting several definitions of globalization. It then
provides an overview of the arguments for and against
globalization and attempts to identify the role of the law in the
process.

12 See World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Proposal by Argentina and
Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO (Aug. 27, 2004),
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.
pdf. The proposal’s goal is to “ensure, in all countries, that the costs do not outweigh the
benefits of IP protection.” Id. at 2. The proposal then lists several specific issues where
the concerns of developing and less developed countries should be taken into
consideration, such as access to information and knowledge, technology transfer, and IP
enforcement. Of particular relevance to this article is the statement that “[t]he provisions
of any treaties in this field must be balanced and clearly take on board the interests of
consumers and the public at large. It is important to safeguard the exceptions and
limitations existing in the domestic laws of Member States.” Id. at 2, § IV.
13 This term refers to the demonstrations that took place in Seattle in late November
and early December, 1999, during the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial
Conference. The demonstrators represented myriad interests and ideologies, though
they shared the general view of what is now known as anti-globalization. There are
numerous documentations of the events, and many cultural and political interpretations
thereof. One of the more interesting interpretations is that of Naomi Klein, whose writing
seems to have inspired many of the demonstrators and provided them with eloquent,
although controversial, arguments. See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO (2001); NAOMI KLEIN,
FENCES AND WINDOWS – DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONT LINE OF THE GLOBALIZATION
DEBATE (2002).
14 MARSHAL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 34 (1964).
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1. Defining Globalization
Globalization has acquired many definitions over a short
period, and there is no single agreed-upon definition.15 There are
several perspectives through which globalization can be addressed,
and the corresponding definitions vary accordingly.
The
discussion that follows distinguishes the definitions for the sake of
clarity,16 although all the definitions are interrelated.
One view of globalization is descriptive. This descriptive view
refers to the connectedness of people around the world. The
means of communication and transportation available to
humanity are continually improving. It is now easier, faster,
cheaper, and safer (at least from a technological perspective) to
travel from one place to another, and more people travel now
than ever before. People also communicate more easily, using
technologies such as electronic mail, satellite telephony, cellular
phones and Internet telephony (VoIP). While the end of the Cold
War and other political and economic changes have accompanied
technological progress, the descriptive view of globalization
focuses on human interaction. In this McLuhanian sense, the
world has become, at least relatively speaking, a global village.
A second meaning of globalization is cultural
homogenization.
More people now share similar cultural
backgrounds, or at least similar cultural experiences, with respect
to fashion, food, art, and even music and movies. Harry Potter,
Madonna, Disney, Hollywood movies, Nike, MTV, Microsoft
products, Peer to Peer (P2P) file sharing technologies, and
McDonalds are all examples of this shared culture. Young people
today have much more in common with their peers around the
world than their parents’ generation did. The “global village”
means that the world is becoming closer, more uniform, and
culturally standardized. Cultural homogenization means that
local, distinctive values and traditions change, and some may even
disappear. Of course, there are still many cultural differences
between peer groups around the world. Language, tradition,
religion, financial divides and other factors prevent many from
being part of the emerging global culture, and even those who are
caught up in the global culture experience it differently. Much of
this global culture is ideological: the emerging global culture
carries and conveys (and reinforces) a message of consumerism,
15 For
a sociological account of globalization, see ROLAND ROBERTSON,
GLOBALIZATION – SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE (1992).
16 See Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization as Hybridization, in GLOBAL MODERNITIES 45
(Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash & Roland Robertson eds., 1997) (discussing the
indeterminacy of the many conceptualizations of globalization).
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dividing the world into producers and consumers; sellers and
buyers.17 Money is the key to participation in the consumerist
culture, and capital is the vision. In such a global village,
producers of cultural products target a global audience of
potential buyers, often turning to the least common denominator,
which easily crosses borders.
A third meaning of globalization is economic. Under this
view, globalization envisions worldwide growth within one united
market rather than in separate geographic and political
economies. The means to achieve economic globalization is
through free trade, especially the free flow of capital and direct
foreign investments, accompanied by technological diffusion.
Economic growth is the ultimate goal, and efficiency, competition,
and specialization are cast as the chief tools of integrating
economies. In this context, “free trade” means uninhibited flow
of capital, goods and labor, and, in the context of G©, it means
the free flow of commodified information. This creates an
interesting juxtaposition, where commodified information is
superimposed upon “free” information – free from regulation and
private control.18 This form of economic globalization requires
the removal of so-called trade barriers, such as tariffs, import
quotas, and various labor-related regulations.19
Economic
globalization requires foreign investments not to be burdened. It
also means that the flow of human capital is easier, such that
employees can migrate from one place to another. Economic
globalization is thus an enhanced version of capitalism: the idea of
a free market is transposed onto the global market. Whereas free
market ideology insists on a laissez-faire approach and limits
governmental intervention with the market, the ideology of the
global economy limits governmental intervention in general, in an
attempt to bypass local governments.20
Who gains from globalization? Why is it such a contested
process? The debate regarding globalization is political, and, in
17 For a discussion of globalization along the lines of the cultural ideology of
consumerism, see LESLIE SKLAIR, SOCIOLOGY OF THE GLOBAL SYSTEM (1995).
18 Thanks to Peter Drahos for suggesting this juxtaposition.
19 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines globalization as “the increasingly
close integration of markets for commodities, labor, and capital.” IMF, Seminar,
Globalization
in
Historical
Perspective
(Aug.
12,
2002),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2002/global/eng/index.htm. See IMF,
Globalization: Threat or Opportunity? (Apr. 12, 2000) (corrected Jan. 2002),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm#II.
20 Both the free market and the free trade ideologies resent external intervention in
the markets and prefer deregulation to regulation. However, once a market failure is
identified, regulation is justified. The production of creative works and research and
development might not take place when the products can be copied; hence, under the
economic analysis of intellectual property, regulation of creative production in the form
of copyright law is not only justified, but required to enable the functioning of the market.
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order to better understand its intellectual property context, a brief
survey of this debate is due.
2. The Debate About Globalization
The “global village” view of globalization resonates well with
those who enjoy the new opportunities created by the progress of
communication and transportation. In addition to the glamour of
being cosmopolitan citizens of the global village, these citizens
appreciate the closer relationships facilitated by the sharing of a
common cultural identity and the establishment of new
communities, virtual or real, which operate across political and
geographical borders. However, the most active proponents of
globalization are those who benefit from its economic impact,
namely, investors and transnational mega-corporations.
There are economic, ideological, and political arguments in
favor of globalization. The few countries that have managed to
progress (economically, as measured by their Gross National
Product (GNP)) serve as proof of the economic success of
globalization. Proponents, such as scholar Jagdish Bhagwati, point
to statistics and argue that “trade enhances growth, and that
growth reduces poverty.”21 It is often the case that globalization is
associated with democratization and with freedom:22 “globalization
leads to prosperity, and prosperity in turn leads to
democratization of politics with the rise of the middle class.”23
According to Bhagwati, the democracy-enabling factor is the new
technology, which enables the poor (“rural farmers” in Bhagwati’s
words) to bypass those in power (“dominant classes and castes”).24
Bhagwati’s argument thus builds on the disintermediation effect
of technology.25 However, Bhagwati’s discussion indicates that the
causation between globalization and democratization has yet to be
established.26 This argument is fostered by the change in the
political climate in the aftermath of the Cold War and the fall of
the Berlin Wall. In the aftermath of the turbulent Cold War era,
in the mid-1990s, Francis Fukuyama declared that it was the “end
of history,” in the sense that the battle over ideologies had been

JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 53 (2004).
See, e.g., Peter Martin, The Moral Case for Globalisation, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE
(May 1997), available at http://mondediplo.com/1997/05/globalisation3157.
23 BHAGWATI, supra note 21, at 94.
24 Id. at 93.
25 For the disintermediation effect of technology, see ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE
CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND
CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW (1999); NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, LAW,
ECONOMICS AND CYBERSPACE 91 (2004).
26 BHAGWATI, supra note 21, at 93-96.
21
22
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decided, in favor of liberal, capitalistic democracies.27
Unfortunately, Fukayama’s statement was premature, and there is
still a deep cultural divide in our world,28 and several civilizations
remain in conflict.29
The arguments in favor of globalization are not left
unchallenged. The movement against globalization brought
together many critics with different agendas. Concerns about
poverty, health, wealth distribution, decline of education and,
more generally, about social injustice and inequality, together with
concerns of cultural imperialism, environmental devastation and
economic effects, such as unemployment, all became common
ground for the emerging coalition against globalization.30 From
the streets of Seattle, Prague, Genoa, Washington and other sites
where the WTO, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World
Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), and The Group of Eight (G8) leaders met while
demonstrators clashed with the police, one common theme
emerged: the complaint against globalization is about the abuse of
power. No one seriously doubts the fact that the world is more
“global” than ever before. Political changes, such as the end of
the Cold War, the strengthening of the European Union, and the
emergence of new democracies, combined with technological
changes, such as satellite television and, of course, the Internet, all
enable globalization. This is the very embodiment of the
McLuhanian global village. Leaving aside the arguments in favor
of a return to nature, à la Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the argument
against globalization does not seriously challenge these post-Cold
War changes, nor does it resist them. Rather, the argument
against globalization is that the stronger kids on the block use
their power to take advantage of the weaker kids; that inequality of
wealth is abused to further strengthen the stronger members of
the global economy at the expense of the poor. Essentially, the
complaint is that the benefits of globalization are unfairly shared
by a few rich corporations rather than by the majority of human
beings in each nation within the global village. This might be a
problem of adjustment; that globalization at too rapid a pace
causes friction. New tools, new mindsets and new policies require

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1993).
See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD: HOW GLOBALISM AND TRIBALISM ARE
SHAPING THE WORLD (1995).
29 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER (1998).
30 See generally THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND FOR A TURN TOWARD THE
LOCAL 297 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996) [hereinafter THE CASE
AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY].
27
28
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time to settle in and to be gradually implemented. Globalization
cannot be achieved overnight.
There are many underlying themes and interests at play in
the globalization analysis, and several interests are in conflict with
each other. Some critics of globalization object to it on the basis
of the consumerism of the North. Others protest the power held
by global corporations.31 Still others object to globalizations based
on either socialist or nationalist sentiments.
Occasionally,
objections to globalization are addressed to a specific corporation
or a particular country. Some opponents of globalization,
addressing its democratic deficiencies32 fear that the rush of
capitalism imposed on new, previously non-capitalist democracies
will negatively affect their fragile economies and social fabrics.
Another critique of globalization challenges the image of
globalization. Globalization is marketed as an opportunity to
achieve technological progress and economic prosperity. Critics
argue, however, that this is a hollow image and that globalization
lacks a “human face.” Consider the common terminology used in
international forums to distinguish between developed countries,
developing countries, and least developed countries (LDCs). As
long as the Cold War occupied the West and the East, LDCs were
regarded as “third world countries.” Now, the criterion for
distinguishing between nations is no longer political. Instead, it is
the economy that matters. The United Nations publishes the
authoritative list of LDCs, which is based on low income, human
resource weaknesses, and economic vulnerability.33 Currently,
there are fifty countries on this list.34 The terminology carries a
(false) message: that the developing and least developed countries
are at a temporary stage; that a least developed country can
become a developing country and ultimately join the developed
countries. Some countries have managed to upgrade themselves –
South Korea is one example35 – but the top end of the scale is not
31 Tony Clarke, Mechanisms of Corporate Rule, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY, supra note 30, at 297.
32 See Ralph Nader & Lori Wallach, GATT, NAFTA, and the Subversion of the Democratic
Process, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 30, at 92.
33 See U.N. Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries,
Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States, The Criteria for
the
Identification
of
the
LDCs,
http://www.un.org/specialrep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006); Wolfgang Sachs, NeoDevelopment: “Global Ecological Management,” in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY,
supra note 30, at 239-41 (criticizing the economic nature of these criteria).
34 See U.N. Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries,
Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States, List of LDCs,
http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). The U.N.
does not compose a list of developed or developing countries.
35 However, there is a debate as to the factors that brought about the economic
development of South Korea. See, e.g., Wooseok Ok, Policy Complementarities in Economic
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fixed. The developed countries keep progressing at a pace that is
far faster than that of the least developed countries.
This critique attempts to expose the real face of
globalization.36 Scholars and critics gather information about the
costs of globalization, which are not spread equally. These
scholars document the North’s politics towards the South and
attempt to expose the hidden mechanisms by which the North
gains, while others lose. Sometimes revealing the methods behind
the North’s gains it is an easy task, but in other cases, those hidden
mechanisms require more delicate unearthing.37 Accordingly, this
article attempts to trace some aspects of globalization in the field
of copyright law and assess its ramifications, which are not found
in broad strokes, but in minute details.
While the debate continues, the campaign against
globalization is an uphill one. Globalization is carried out in many
ways, and the process is a constant one. International bodies such
as the IMF or the World Bank and other global institutions, such
as the WTO, are all forums of globalization. Global media
networks, such as MTV and CNN, are yet another forum of
globalization. There are other cultural and political mechanisms
of globalization, however, in this article, the focus is on the role of
the law in globalization, or globalization-by-law.
3. Globalization-by-Law
The law is an important tool by which power is exercised.
The law imposes the command of the sovereign with more subtlety
than does sheer force. But the law is no less powerful than brute
force.
The law is a civilized, amorphous, and intangible
mechanism, and it is within this gentle façade that the power of
the rule of law lies. The law is inaccessible and incomprehensible
to most citizens. An employee who is fired because her workplace
has been relocated to another country overnight cannot be
expected to intuitively identify “the law” as the cause of her misery,
let alone the laws of globalization.38
Development: The Case of South Korea, 5 J. KOREAN ECON. 7 (2004).
36 One of the most prominent critics in economics is Nobel Laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz.
See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002).
37 See, e.g., Edward Goldsmith, Development as Colonialism, in THE CASE AGAINST THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 30, at 253, 261 (describing how the North controls the
South by way of lending money for aid). See also Walden Bello, Structural Adjustment
Programs: “Success” for Whom?, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 30,
at 285 (discussing “Structural Adjustment Programs” imposed on countries of the South).
See generally South Centre: An Intergovernmental Organization of Developing Countries,
http://www.southcentre.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
38 There are a few exceptions. A demonstration by half a million Indian farmers in
1993 in Bangalore against the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (GATT), the
precursor to the WTO, was an outstanding preview of the demonstrations that would
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The laws of globalization employ sophisticated means to
execute the global agenda. The laws that enable globalization
usually have a local incarnation. The political structure is simple
but crude: a country joins an international legal instrument and is
required to adapt its laws so as to meet its new international
commitments. Thus, the last chain of globalization is always a
local law, which is enforced through local mechanisms. Citizens
are likely to place the blame first on their own governments (at
least in democracies), and not on international bodies, other
countries, or some obscure international treaty. It is only at a later
stage, when greater understanding of the political process is
gained, that the blame of ordinary citizens is directed elsewhere.
Proponents of the idea of globalization-by-law call on another
idea for support: harmonization. The diversity of laws among
nations is blamed as an impediment to trade and progress, and
harmonization is called on as the solution.39
Critics of
harmonization, however, are skeptical, since harmonization means
giving up the unique attributes of the local polity. These critics
argue that harmonization is just a disguise, and that there is no
harmony in a world where the powerful impose their will upon the
weak.
However, globalization is a complex economic, political,
social, and cultural process and need not necessarily be all-ornothing. An awareness of this concept leads to an examination of
the intermediate points on the local-global axis: GloCalization.
B. GloCalization
Sociologists who document processes of globalization report
that it has a complex effect on society, involving the interaction of
global forces, ideologies and economic powers local players. The
result of this complex interaction is called GloCalization.40
occur in Seattle in 1999. See supra note 13. See Vandana Shiva & Radha Holla-Bhar, Piracy
by Patent: The Case of the Neem Tree, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note
30 at 146, 148.
39 The European Union often describes its measures as those of harmonization,
although, unlike the more globally applicable mechanisms described in the text, the
inequality of power among the twenty-five member states is less dramatic than global gaps.
See e.g., the first recital of the Copyright Directive, stating: “The Treaty provides for the
establishment of an internal market and the institution of a system ensuring that
competition in the internal market is not distorted. Harmonisation of the laws of the
Member States on copyright and related rights contributes to the achievement of these
objectives.” Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 274) 33 (EC) (regarding the
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information
society).
40 Wikipedia offers two definitions of GloCalization, neither of which reflects the
argument in the text. The first is the creation of products intended for the global market,
but customized to suit local culture. The second refers to the use of such global
technologies as the Internet to offer local services. Definition of Glocalisation,
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GloCalization is where global norms meet local norms. The
meeting point can be cultural, economic, or political. One
sociologist defines GloCalization as “the interpenetration of the
global and the local resulting in unique outcomes in different
geographic areas.”41 Examples range from the impact that
globalized fast food restaurants have over local dishes,42 to business
strategies applied by multinational firms to blend themselves into
local markets,43 or to the rise of a localized nationalist movement
in a single country.44 Accordingly, the concept of GloCalization
can assist in describing social phenomena, explaining them, and
providing a measure against which one can evaluate globalization.
Further, it can be a political strategy or a political goal. In recent
years, legal analyses have begun to use this concept.45
GloCalization can also serve as a deliberate strategy
undertaken to empower local communities. GloCalization can
assist in creating a civil society that can cope with, and
accommodate, the new foreign powers of globalization.46 In this
sense, GloCalization can ease the shock of globalization.
Accordingly, GloCalization can be viewed as a social space where
an unstable, often unpredictable, dialectic relationship takes place
between the global and the local. Once the two forces reach some
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glocalization (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). See Craig
Stroupe, Glocalization, IDEAS, http://www.d.umn.edu/~cstroupe/ideas/glocalization.html
(last visited Sept. 21, 2006) (in which University of Minnesota professor Craig Stroupe
defines GloCalization as the existence of direct relationships between communities and
the global system that bypass national governments and markets).
41 See GEORGE RITZER, THE GLOBALIZATION OF NOTHING 73 (2004).
42 See Uri Ram, Glocommodification: How the Global Consumes the Local – McDonald’s in
Israel, 52 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 11 (2004).
43 See, e.g., Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in a Postnational Economy: Rethinking
U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 430 (2002).
44 See generally BARBER, supra note 28.
45 A WestLaw search (July, 2006) yielded thirty citations of the term “glocalization” in
United States law review articles (including two with the spelling “glocalisation”). Most
articles mentioned it as a term of political science and international relations, and only
some utilized the concept to argue for actual conclusions. For uses in the intellectual
property field, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark
Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 959 (2004) (applying the concept to
examine the idea of tying trademark law to the territoriality of good will, regardless of
political borders).
In many cases, the ideas encapsulated in the term “GloCalization” were applied
without using the term explicitly. For example, an argument that WTO dispute resolution
panels should take into account the domestic dynamics of intellectual property law
making can be explained as a case of GloCalization. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle
C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Law Making, 36 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 95 (2004). Understood via the lens of GloCalization, the argument advanced by
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss is a suggestion to infuse local norms into the global adjudication
process, and thus to enable more space for the local within the global.
46 See,
e.g.,
Glocalization,
DEVELOPMENT
GATEWAY
http://topics.developmentgateway.org/glocalization (last visited Aug. 23, 2006). Of
course, preserving local culture is not always a good idea. The discussion in the text refers
to situations in which the attitude toward the local culture is either supportive or neutral,
and hence finds value in preserving it per se.
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sort of equilibrium, GloCalization can be said to be the result of
the global meeting the local.
A successful outcome of
GloCalization might be one that allows a local community to enjoy
the best of all worlds: the community can enjoy the benefits of
globalization without losing the benefits of the local culture,
economy, and social fabric. However, the result might also be
negative: where the disadvantages of each of the two interacting
forces, the global and local cultures, combine to leave the local
community with only the detrimental effects of globalization.
GloCalization offers local culture a chance of surviving in the
face of the mighty global forces. It offers an opportunity to
smooth the process of globalization and to enable the local
community to participate in shaping its own future. For a
traditional community or conservative society striving to preserve
its social norms and old social order, this is likely to lead to a
compromise of some sort. But a compromise is better than an
unconditional surrender to globalization. GloCalization thus has
empowering potential:47 the old community, its political habits,
and the pre-globalization social norms are not completely
eliminated, but rather, are adapted to the new situation.
GloCalization is a compromise between old and new.
This article now returns to an examination of the ways in
which intellectual property is global. Copyright law is becoming a
global matter, and when G© is applied in a jurisdiction, the result
is one of GloCalization: there is a meeting of G© and of local
culture, norms, and traditions. One meeting point in particular,
that of G© and freedom of speech, will be examined in Part IV,
infra.
C. Intellectual Property Globalization
A series of treaties – most notably the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) and the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works
(1886), brought intellectual property into the field of
international law in the late nineteenth century.
These
conventions established common minimum standards and
provided benefits to the countries (and their authors and
inventors) that joined.48 Many countries did not join, however.
47 GloCal
Forum,
GloCalization
Manifesto
(Sept.
7,
2004),
http://topics.developmentgateway.org/glocalization (under “Key Issues” on the left
sidebar click on “The Glocalization Manifesto”).
48 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised Sept. 28, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. The national treatment principle, for example, ensures
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The United States, for example, joined Berne only in 1989; up
until then, it had only been a member of the Universal Copyright
Convention (UCC).49 The Berne Convention is now incorporated
by reference into the TRIPS Agreement.50 The combined result of
Berne and TRIPS, as well as other measures, which will be
discussed shortly, combine to form a G© regime.51 Because of the
array of international agreements on the subject, copyright laws
around the globe resemble each other more than most laws in
other fields.
Intellectual property globalization has taken three basic and
interrelated forms over the last two decades: multilateral treaties,
bilateral agreements, and unilateral measures. The Uruguay
Round of Trade Negotiations, which started in the mid-1980s and
resulted in the mid-1990s with the replacement of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with the WTO, reflects
the shift from an international IP order to a global IP regime. On
top of this global infrastructure came bilateral agreements,
followed by unilateral measures. Now, all three layers are tied
together in an expanding spiral form.
1. Multilateral Treaties
a. WIPO
The Berne Convention has been administered by WIPO since
the 1970s. However, WIPO’s “one nation, one vote” system gave
developing countries the power to block the initiatives of
industrialized nations.52 Those nations and industries that wanted
a wider scope of protection, greater compliance with the treaty,
and more tools of local enforcement, had to turn to other
forums.53 The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations provided
that works are protected in nations other than just that of the origin. See id. at art. 5.
49 Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731 [hereinafter UCC],
revised July 24, 1971, 25.2 U.S.T. 1341 [hereinafter Paris Amendment]. The leading
United Kingdom copyright treatise declares that the UCC “has lost part of its raison d’être
and importance.” K. GARNETT, J. RAYNER & JAMES G. DAVIES, COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES
ON COPYRIGHT 1174 (14th ed. Sweet & Maxwell 1999). Currently, ninety-nine countries
are parties to the UCC, sixty-four of which have ratified the Paris Amendment. The UCC
is administered by The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultrual Organization
(UNESCO).
See
generally
Universal
Copyright
Convention,
UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org (in search window type “copyright convention,” and then click on
link to “Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971”) (last visited
Sept. 21, 2006).
50 See TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 9(1). Note that the Berne Convention’s moral rights
are exempted from the TRIPS Agreement. Id.
51 Okediji suggests that we understand TRIPS as a “regime.” Okediji’s analysis is based
on a “regime theory,” derived from international relations theory and international law.
Okediji, supra note 7, at 597.
52 See RYAN, supra note 7, at 104-13; see also Negotiating, supra note 7, at 166.
53 See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
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such a forum.54
b. The Uruguay Negotiations
The initiative to include intellectual property issues within
the framework of trade came from a group of industry leaders: the
Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiation (ACTN), which
persuaded the United States Trade Representatives (USTR) to do
so.55 Accordingly, IP was placed on the negotiation table under
the pressure of a few developed countries. One of these industry
leaders, the United States, even went so far as to apply political
pressure against objecting developing countries in a process
described by one scholar as no less than “bully[ing].”56
In the negotiations of TRIPS, developed countries applied a
strategy of “linkage bargain diplomacy,” in which the developed
countries tied unrelated issues together and refused to break the
package: a developing country had the choice of joining and
accepting all treaties as presented, or declining any part of the
treaties and being left out.57 It was an all-or-nothing choice. In the
case of TRIPS, the linkage was between IP and trade of goods,
such as agricultural products and textiles. The negotiations took
the form of “circles of consensus,” in which a circle of countries in
agreement was continuously expanded, thereby avoiding a
confrontational situation.58 This “negotiation” strategy led to the
inclusion of TRIPS in the framework of the WTO.
One might object to the notion that developing countries
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 20-21 (2004) [hereinafter
Helfer, Regime Shifting] (arguing that the shift from the WIPO forum to GATT (and WTO,
including TRIPS) was deliberate, since it provided the United States and the European
Community with greater power due to the resulting trade leverage, the principle of
consensus in the WTO, the WTO’s linkage of intellectual property to trade, and the
dispute resolution system of the WTO).
Jessica Litman documented the politics of copyright legislation in the United States.
She reported the attempts of the pro-copyright parties to promote their interests through
international bodies, and their (initial) failure to do so in WIPO. JESSICA LITMAN,
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET 129 (2001).
54 See generally RYAN, supra note 7, at 104-13. For a documentation of the shift from
GATT to TRIPS, see DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 10-26 (2d ed. 2003).
55 See RYAN, supra note 7, at 105; PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION
FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 114-120 (2002). (Drahos &
Braithwaite refer to the Committee as the “ACTN,” the Advisory Committee on Trade
Negotiation).
56 See Ryan, supra note 7, at 108. Drahos also documents the use by the United States
of bilateral means to convince objecting countries to accept TRIPS, especially in the case
of Brazil. Negotiating, supra note 7, at 170-71.
57 RYAN, supra note 7, at 92.
58 Drahos describes this as a means to exclude opposition. Negotiating, supra note 7, at
167-69. Gervais, on the contrary, describes the process in a more favorable manner, of
formal and informal meetings, with full transparency. GERVAIS, supra note 54, at 20. For a
critical analysis of the political strategies that led to TRIPS, see Susan K. Sell, Trips and the
Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 481 (2002).
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were coerced into consenting during the TRIPS negotiations, as
no country was forced to join the WTO.59 However, whereas
joining the Berne Convention was optional for a country, joining
TRIPS was not: given the linkage of IP and trade, it would have
been unrealistic to expect a country to opt out of the WTO. One
commentator described the pressure to opt into the WTO as being
made up of a combination of the following: a bargain of European
Union concessions on agricultural exports, promises by the
United States not to pursue unilateral measures, and threats that
the Uruguay Round of negotiations would fail.60
Another
commentator described it as “old fashioned, Western-style
imperialism.”61
One view from the South described the
negotiations as “essentially an asymmetric, non-transparent and
autocratic process.”62
Even Bhagwati, an enthusiastic proglobalization scholar, harshly criticized the inclusion of
intellectual property within the framework of the WTO,
concluding that, “the damage inflicted on the WTO system and on
the poor nations has been substantial,” and that “TRIPS . . . [was]
like the introduction of cancer cells into a healthy body.”63
Bhagwati appears to be most disturbed by the effects that global
patent laws have had on the access of poor people and nations to
medicine, but he has also critiqued the very inclusion of TRIPS
within a trade agreement and the politics that led to its inclusion.
c. TRIPS
TRIPS now binds the 149 members of the WTO.64 TRIPS
includes several layers: basic principles, expansion of the bundle
59 Peter Yu observes that the story of TRIPS is usually told in one of four narratives: a
bargain narrative, a coercion narrative, an ignorance narrative, and a self-interest
narrative. Yu argues that none of these narratives is complete, but each provides valuable
insights into TRIPS. Peter K. Yu, The First Ten Years of the TRIPS Agreement: TRIPS and Its
Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, The First Ten
Years]. The discussion in the current article tells the story of TRIPS with all these
narratives, and emphasizes the trade aspects in each of these narratives.
60 Frederick M. Abbott, The International Intellectual Property Order Enters the 21st Century,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 471, 472-73 (1996).
61 Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated and Overprotective, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613, 615 (1996).
62 See South Centre, The TRIPS Agreement – A Guide for the South 8 (1997),
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/trips/tripsagreement.pdf.
63 BHAGWATI, supra note 21, at 182-83.
64 See WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers,
(Dec. 11, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, for a
current list of WTO members. TRIPS set three dates for complying: 1996 for the
developed countries, 2000 for the developing countries, and 2006 for the less developed
countries. The latter date was extended to 2016 regarding provisions on pharmaceutical
patents, as decided in the Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and
Public Health. WTO, Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2
(Nov.
20,
2001),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf.
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of rights, enforcement, and a dispute settlement system.
The first layer of TRIPS is the requirement of minimum
standards of protection by the incorporation of the Berne
Convention, as amended in 1971,65 which ensures some
commonality among member states. Under Berne, copyright law
remained territorial, but each country had to adapt its laws to
meet the minimum standards of the Convention. These minimum
standards were coupled with the “national treatment principle,”
which required member countries to apply their copyright laws
equally to citizens of other member countries.66 Berne left the
members with leeway regarding the application of the minimum
standards and did not require complete equality in how members
treated foreign nationals as compared with how members treated
one another.67 One of TRIPS’ novelties was the introduction of
the “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) treatment in the context of IP.68
This principle requires that all nationals of all WTO members
should enjoy the same legal treatment.69 Thus far, the MFN
principle is broader than the national treatment principle of
Berne. The MFN rule has some exceptions, of which Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) are the most important, since FTAs are the
avenue through which copyright is expanded beyond that which is
required by TRIPS.70
The second layer of TRIPS adds new kinds of works to be
protected, and expands the bundle of rights beyond those
guaranteed by the Berne Convention. For example, TRIPS
requires protection for computer programs and grants the right of
commercial rental,71 while the Berne Convention did neither.
While this change did not represent an expansion of the scope of
protection afforded to copyright owners in the developed
countries,72 it greatly expanded the copyright laws of the
developing countries.
In the long term, it might be beneficial for developing
TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 9.
Berne Convention, supra note 48, at art. 5(1).
For a clear summary of these principles of Berne, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The
Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 736-42 (2001).
68 TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 4. See also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 18.06[A][1][b] (1963).
69 See GERVAIS, supra note 54, at 104-10.
70 See Part II.B.2, infra.
71 TRIPS, supra note 1, at arts. 10 (computer programs), 11 (rental rights).
72 In the United States, for example, computer programs are protected as of 1980. See
Computer Software Copyright Act 1980 § 10(b), Pub. L. No. 96–517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3024
(Dec. 12, 1980) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 117). The 1980 Act stated that it was meant to
preserve the status quo, which was rather unsettled at the time. The commercial rental
rights are part of the right of distribution. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (“publication”); 17
U.S.C. § 106(3). The rental right is subject to the first sale doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 109.
65
66
67
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countries to have strong copyright laws, to protect their own
authors and facilitate the emergence of local content industries
(assuming that there is a causal connection between more
copyright protection and innovation). Presently, however, the
beneficiaries of a strong copyright regime are foreign copyright
owners. These foreign copyright owners, not surprisingly, are
almost all citizens (and corporations) of the North.73
The third layer of TRIPS is that of enforcement.74 TRIPS
requires member countries to provide copyright owners with civil
and administrative procedures to enforce their rights, as well as
criminal penalties for violations of those rights. This might sound
obvious, as it does not make much sense to have new laws without
the means to enforce them. However, this requirement means
that countries need to allocate resources and to change their
spending priorities according to external interests. Indeed, IP
police units have been established worldwide.75 Article 41(5) of
TRIPS purports not to require this, as it states that, “[n]othing in
this Part creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of
resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights
and the enforcement of law in general.” However, the bilateral
commitments and unilateral measures under TRIPS render this
article ineffective, as they require enforcement beyond TRIPS.76 A
Brazilian commentator reported that, “[s]pecial courts and special
forces were created to pursue [IP enforcement], even though the
increase of budgetary and personal resources was not
proportionately extended to other pressing needs, like fighting

73 For the various narratives of the power relationship between the North and the
South in this context, see Yu, The First Ten Years, supra note 59.
74 TRIPS, supra note 1, at pt. III. Gervais reports that the enforcement provisions of
TRIPS were “drafted on the basis of concerns expressed by industry experts and other
interested parties.” GERVAIS, supra note 54, at 69.
75 See, e.g., Global Congress/Interpol Latin America Regional Forum on Combating
Counterfeiting and Piracy, The Rio Declaration §§ 3-4, 6-7 (June 14, 2005), available at
http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/Press/Rio%20Declaration%20Final%20Draft.pdf;
Interpol,
Intellectual
Property
(IP)
Crime,
http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/IntellectualProperty/Default.asp.
76 See, e.g., Office of the USTR, Final Text of the Morocco Free Trade Agreement,
art.15.11(3), June 15, 2004, KAV 7206 (stating that “[t]he Parties understand that a
decision that a Party makes on the distribution of enforcement resources shall not excuse
that
Party
from
complying
with
this
Chapter”),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_Text/Section_I
ndex.html.
Article 17.11(2) of the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement echoes TRIPS art.
41(5) but also adds that “[t]he distribution of resources for the enforcement of
intellectual property rights shall not excuse a Party from compliance with the provisions
of this Article.” Office of the USTR, Chile FTA final text, art. 17.11(2), June 6, 2003, KAV
6375
[hereinafter
U.S.-Chile
FTA],
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Inde
x.html.
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drug-related crime.”77
Local enforcement might run into various problems,
especially when subject to a country’s international obligations,
and even more so when the line between public interests and the
private commercial interests of copyright owners is blurred. Thus,
for example, once an IP police unit is established, it might lack the
power to determine its own priorities, as those priorities are
dictated by external forces. Thus, an IP police unit might, on its
own volition, be interested in dealing with counterfeit alcoholic
products or medicines, as these tend to be of low quality and
dangerous. Instead, the local IP unit may be recruited to assist
private copyright owners in enforcing their rights in software or
sound recordings.78 This is even more frustrating, as copyright
owners sometimes use criminal procedures to place pressure on
alleged infringers and to strengthen their bargaining positions in
discussing the possible settlement of a civil dispute. Once a
settlement is achieved, the complaint submitted to the police is
withdrawn.
Even if the police are interested in further
investigating the matter, they may find that those who complained
in the first place will no longer cooperate with them.79
A fourth layer of TRIPS is specific to the international level
and applies to the members of the WTO. The WTO framework
includes a dispute settlement system, which it considers to be a
central pillar of its multilateral trade system.80 The dispute
settlement system creates one mechanism of resolutions of
violations of any of several agreements under the WTO, including
TRIPS.81 The settlement process is intended to encourage
negotiations of disputes among countries,82 but it also provides for
some remedies. The authority to decide trade disputes lies with
77 Denis Borges Barbosa, Abstract, Counting Ten for TRIPs: Author Rights and Access to
Information – A Cockroach’s View of Encroachment (SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=842564.
78 See, e.g., DVIR OREN ET AL., NEW COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION FOR ISRAEL 17 (Niva ElkinKoren
and
Michael
Birnhack
eds.,
2004)
(Hebrew),
available
at
http://techlaw.haifa.ac.il/papers/copyright_seminar.pdf (regarding a report, based on a
public statement of the legal advisor of the Israeli IP police unit).
79 Id. at 180. Thus, for example, in its response to the 2006 USTR Report, the Israeli
government complained that “[l]ack of cooperation from rights holders continues to
prevent the successful prosecution of some criminal matters.” Submission of the
Government of Israel to the USTR with Respect to the 2006 Special 301 Review, at 3 (on
file with author).
80 WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes,
at
art.
3(2)
(Apr.
15,
1994),
available
at
http://www.wto.int/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm; WTO, Marrakesh Declaration
of 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.int/english/docs_e/legal_e/marrakesh_decl_e.htm [hereinafter DSU].
Article 64 of TRIPS subjects it to the DSU.
81 Other WTO agreements refer to goods and services.
82 DSU, supra note 80, at art. 4.
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the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is the WTO’s
General Council. In practice, the disputes are decided by special
panels, which make recommendations to the DSB.83 A panel’s
recommendation is accepted, unless there is a consensus against it.
Thus, the panels enjoy tremendous power.84 This rule is the
opposite of the previous dispute settlement system under GATT.85
A country that loses a dispute is required to amend its
violating policy in order to bring it into conformity with the WTO
agreement.86 If this option is impractical, or if the losing country
does not comply, the losing country should enter into negotiations
with the complaining country in order to seek a resolution.87 Such
resolution is not generally in the form of direct monetary
compensation; rather, it takes the form of some comparable
measure, such as a trade retaliation, by which tariffs imposed on
goods imported from the complaining country would be reduced.
Failure of such negotiations might result in trade sanctions
imposed on the losing country. The sanctions are structured in a
hierarchical manner, so that the first priority is to impose
sanctions in the same sector as the one in dispute. If this is
impractical or ineffective, sanctions will be imposed under
another WTO agreement.88 This is how a dispute between
Ecuador and the European Union over quotas of bananas resulted
in a remedy in the copyright sector.89 Intellectual property is thus
treated as just another kind of goods.
d. WIPO Copyright Treaty – The WCT
TRIPS is not the only mechanism to globalize IP rights.
WIPO, perhaps fearing that TRIPS would render it irrelevant, and
perhaps driven by powerful industries, initiated amendments to
83 Id. at arts. 6-15 (establishing the panels and determining their procedures); art. 17
(regarding appellate review).
84 Id. at arts. 16, 17(14).
85 See WTO, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, A Unique Contribution,
http://www.wto.int/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Aug. 25,
2006).
86 DSU, supra note 80, at art. 19.
87 Okediji argues that this system allows stronger countries to bypass the rule-based
system of global copyright and replace the judicial-like processes of the DSU with
diplomacy. Thus, stronger countries are able to “bargain down” their TRIPS obligations.
See Okediji, supra note 7, at 634.
88 DSU, supra note 80, at art. 22(3).
89 See Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador, WT/DS27/RWECU (Apr. 12,
1999). The report found that the European Community violated its commitments under
the WTO. See World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes
(July 13, 2001), http://www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/stplay_e.doc. Eventually,
Ecuador did not pursue this remedy. For a discussion of the case, see Marco Bronckers &
Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the WTO, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101, 105
(2005).
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the Berne Convention, which culminated in the 1996 WIPO
Copyright Treaty (WCT).90 Like TRIPS, the WCT incorporates the
Berne Convention and further expands both the subject matter of
copyright law and the accompanying bundle of rights. But the
WCT expansions go beyond TRIPS. Most notably, article 11 of the
WCT requires contracting countries to provide “adequate legal
protection . . . against the circumvention of effective technological
measures,” or, in other words, to provide a protection for Digital
Rights Managements (DRMs).91
Currently, as of September, 2006, the WCT is less popular
than TRIPS and includes sixty contracting parties,92 in contrast to
the WTO’s one hundred and forty-nine members. The reason for
its lack of popularity is probably because the sole subject of the
WCT is copyright law. The WCT does not link trade benefits, or
any other benefits, to the copyright deal. Although many
countries have joined the WCT, there might be another
explanation for the WTC’s lack of popularity: bilateralism.
2. Bilateral Agreements
The multilateral trade treaties of TRIPS and the WCT were
justified in their goal of harmonizing copyright laws around the
world, especially in a world where creative works easily cross
borders.93 From these multilateral agreements, however, a web of
IP-related bilateral agreements has emerged. In these agreements,
such as the Free Trade Agreements discussed above, TRIPS
generally serves as a baseline, and the owners of IP rights are
granted more rights and fewer exceptions or limitations than they
would have under TRIPS.94 Thus, through a process of global
90 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M.
65
(1997),
at
art.
1(1),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html [hereinafter WCT]. More
precisely, the WCT is a “special agreement” within the meaning of article 20 of the Berne
Convention. See id. at art. 1(1).
91 DRM is a generic term, referring to various technological measures which are
designed to control access to a digital work and/or the uses thereof. The access control
measures can range from simple passwords to complex identification procedures. Usagecontrol measures can be designed to limit, for example, the number of times a text
document can be printed, saved, or whether it is possible to copy portions thereof. DRM
is thus a self-help measure. The WCT provides owners of creative works with legal
protection of these self-help measures.
This section of the WCT served the United States content industries by convincing
Congress to enact the anti-circumvention rules in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2006) [hereinafter DMCA]. See generally Pamela
Samuelson,
The
Copyright
Grab,
WIRED
4.01
(1996),
available
at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html.
92 See
WIPO,
Contracting
Parties:
WCT,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=16 (last visited Sep.
22, 2006).
93 See id.
94 Negotiating, supra note 7, at 172-74.
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“ratcheting up,”95 a new layer of IP law has been constructed.
These bilateral agreements result in a “TRIPS-Plus” regime.96 This
mechanism of bilateralism is especially troubling when the parties
have unequal power, as in the case of the United States97 and the
European Union,98 and their less powerful trade partners.
For example, in all of its recent FTAs, the United States
includes similar language, addressing the exclusive reproduction
rights granted to authors in literary and artistic works. The United
States-Chile FTA states, in part, that “[e]ach party shall provide
that authors of literary and artistic works have the right to
authorize or prohibit all reproductions of their works, in any
manner or form, permanent or temporary (including temporary
storage in electronic form).”99
The requirement to include temporary storage is not
addressed in TRIPS and is a controversial addition thereto. Courts
in the United States have found that the temporary copying that
occurs in the context of transmitting information over the
Internet is sufficiently “fixed” to be considered “copying” for the
purposes of copyright law.100 The European Union, however,
95 See Peter Drahos, Securing The Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property Owners
And Their Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 53, 55 (2004)
(describing the process in which bilateral agreements ratchet up the level of intellectual
property protection).
96 Peter Yu suggests that we distinguish between various kinds of provisions, such as
TRIPS-plus and TRIPS-extra. This is a useful distinction, though for rhetorical purposes I
will not apply it here. Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2007).
97 For a critical discussion in the context of data exclusivity in the pharmaceutical
industry, see Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism In Intellectual Property: Defeating The WTO System
For Access To Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79 (2004) (examining the Central
American Free Trade Agreement).
98 For a discussion of the European Union and the TRIPS plus strategy, which is
applied mostly in the fields of trademark and geographical indications, see Willem
Pretorius, TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level is the Playing Field?, in GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS, 183, 194 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002).
99 See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 76. With variations as to the addressees of the right,
see also The United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248,
at
art.
17.4(1)
[hereinafter
U.S.-Australia
FTA],
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/Section_I
ndex.html; United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, art. 15.5(1), June 15, 2004, 44
I.L.M. 544 [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA] (regarding the reproduction of performances
and phonograms); United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement Sept. 14, 2004, 44 I.L.M.
544, at art. 14.4(1) (regarding the reproduction, performances of phonograms)
[hereinafter
U.S.-Bahrain
FTA],
available
at
http://www.ustr.
gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Bahrain_FTA/final_texts/Section_Index.html.
The
United States-Jordan FTA includes by reference articles one through fourteen of the
WCT, and adds also that temporary reproductions should be protected. See United StatesJordan Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 24, 2000, 44 I.L.M. 63art. 4(1)(c), 4(10), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset_upload_file250_5
112.pdf.
100 The origin of this view is in a non-network setting. See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that loading of software from
the Read Only Memory of a computer to its Random Access Memory is a “copy” under the
Copyright Act). The specific ruling in MAI regarding machine maintenance was
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reached the opposite conclusion, allowing member states to
exempt temporary acts of reproduction which are transient or
incidental or which are an integral and essential part of a
technological process, as long as certain conditions are met.101
The United States-Chile FTA includes a similar exemption,102 but
other recent FTAs, such as that between the United States and
Australia, do not.103
Other examples of TRIPS-plus obligations are that parties to
the FTA must not only provide authors the exclusive right to make
their works available to the public,104 but also, the parties to the
FTA are obligated to create anti-circumvention rules.105 These two
obligations are required by the WCT, but not by TRIPS.106
Australia and Morocco, for example, committed in their FTAs with
the United States to enact DMCA-like statutes, even though they
have not ratified the WCT.107 This is a clear example of a bilateral
mechanism which expands copyright protection beyond TRIPS.
While some FTAs faced local opposition, they were signed in the
end.108
Bilateral agreements should be assessed within their political
and global contexts. Each bilateral agreement has its own unique
character, which reflects the political, cultural, or other
relationship between the contracting countries. The United
States-Israel bilateral agreements, for example, reflect the close
political and financial ties between those two countries.109 IP
overruled by Congress in 17 U.S.C. § 117(c). The general rule that temporary copying
amounts to “copying” under the Copyright Act remains, however, and was applied in the
context of the Internet. See also Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry,
Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999).
101 See Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 274) 33 (EC) (regarding the
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information
society).
102 See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 76, at art. 17.7(3) n.17.
103 See U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 99.
104 See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 76, at art. 17.5(3); U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 99,
at art. 17.4(2); U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra note 99, at art. 14.4(2); U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra
note 99, at art. 15.5(3).
105 See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 76, at art. 17.7(5); U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 99,
at art. 17.4(7); U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra note 99, at art. 14.4(7); U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra
note 99, at art. 15.5(8).
106 See WCT, supra note 90, at art. 6 (regarding making works available), art. 11
(regarding anti-circumvention rules).
107 See U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 99, at art. 17.4(7); U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note
99, at art. 15.5(8). Morocco is required, under the FTA, to ratify the WCT. See WCT, supra
note 90, at art. 15.1(2)(g).
108 See, e.g., Peter Martin, The FTAS Clause that Stifles Creativity, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Apr. 14, 2004 (regarding the opposition in Australia to copyright aspects of the
U.S.-Australia
FTA),
available
at
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/04/13/1081838720006.html.
109 See United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 653,
available
at
http://www.mac.doc.gov/tcc/data/commerce_html/TCC_Documents/IsraelFreeTrade.
html.
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bilateral agreements are better understood as part of the
globalization of IP. Bilateral agreements both rely on the current
global level and serve as the basis for the next wave of global IP
law. They are part of the process of the ratcheting-up of IP law.
3. Unilateral Measures
Unilateral measures provide a powerful means to expand IP
rights. One such measure is found in section 301 of the United
States Trade Act of 1974, as amended in 1984. A procedure
known as “special 301 review”110 empowers United States Trade
Representatives (USTR) to examine the level of protection
accorded to American-owned intellectual property in countries
with which the United States has trade relations. The USTR
publishes its report once a year, an act which worries quite a few
trade ministries around the world.111 Countries are categorized in
the USTR publication by placement on one of several lists: Priority
Foreign Country, Priority Watch List, and Watch List.
Classification as a Priority Foreign Country, considered to be the
worst category, might result in trade sanctions, and classification
in any list is likely to result in heavy political pressure. The Trade
Act was amended to enable the USTR to reach a finding that a
country’s IP protection is inadequate, even if the country is TRIPS
compliant.112 This is a powerful TRIPS-plus mechanism: even if a
country is TRIPS compliant, the USTR may require it to do
more.113
The 301 review process requires extensive resources, which
the United States government lacks. But there are those who are
happy to offer assistance – the content industries.
The
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), a powerful
coalition of United States copyright-based industries, is actively
involved in this process, as it collects and analyzes the data that
110 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2114(c), 2411). The European Union has a similar mechanism,
but one which has several safeguards aimed to prevent abuse. See Stephen Woolcock,
European Union Trade Policy: Domestic Institutions and Systematic Factors, in THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 234, 242-43 (Dominic Kelly & Wyn
Grant eds., 2005).
111 See,
e.g., USTR 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (Apr. 2006), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Specia
l_301_Review/asset_upload_file473_9336.pdf [hereinafter 2006 REPORT].
112 Trade Act § 301(b) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(A)). See
generally 4 NIMMER, supra note 68, § 18.04[A].
113 The “301 process” was challenged by the European Commission under the WTO’s
DSU. See Panel Report, United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) (finding that section 301 does not violate the DSU but that
it must be applied in accordance therewith). See Lina M. Montén, The Inconsistency between
Section 301 and TRIPS: Counterproductive with Respect to the Future of International Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights?, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 387 (2005).
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forms the basis of the annual 301 Report.114 In fact, in the political
sense, the American copyright industry has captured the USTR.115
4. A Web of Global Copyright
TRIPS transcended the Berne Convention’s international
foundations and created a global copyright regime, but the WCT
and the accompanying web of bilateral agreements and unilateral
measures have further raised the standard of copyright protection.
In light of the dynamic nature of G©, it is not unreasonable to
assume that there will soon be a new call to harmonize copyright
law around the world, and the new global standard will be akin to
that of the bilateral agreements and unilateral measures.
Professor Daniel Gervais, a leading scholar of global IP, estimates
that the current state of reviews, negotiations, and politics might
lead to a “TRIPS II” Agreement.116 Alternatively, as the South now
has a better understanding of the dynamics of G© law (and of
global IP law in general), one commentator has observed an
attempt by developing countries to halt the expansion of IP rights
and restore balance by shifting the international IP regimes out of
the WTO and into other international organizations.117 The
Development Agenda, mentioned in Part I of this article, is a
promising step in this direction, in that it offers an alternative to
the expansionist agenda of IP law and emphasizes the public
interest in access to knowledge.118 For now, the new G© is the
regime in place, and an exploration of the nature and essence of
this form of copyright law is due.
D. The Nature of Global Copyright
What does it mean that copyright is globalized? This Part
outlines the nature of G© and argues that G© is not a unified
body of law, but rather is a complex web of inter-related layers of
international law applied locally within the existing legal, political,
and cultural environment. This local application renders the idea
of a unified global law a fiction. This Part further argues that G©
lacks a coherent underlying philosophical theory, and that
copyright protection has been reincarnated as a means of trade.

IIPA, http://www.iipa.com/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
See Drahos, supra note 7, at 173; Drahos & Braithwaite, supra note 55, at 90-99. It
should be noted that the content industries are not alone in capturing the regulators.
Pharmaceutical companies have tremendous power over these governmental agencies.
116 See GERVAIS, supra note 54, at 48.
117 See Helfer, supra note 53.
118 See supra note 11. See Pedro de Paranagua Moniz, Abstract, The Development Agenda
for WIPO: Another Stillbirth? A Battle Between Access to Knowledge and Enclosure (Getulio Vargas
Foundation 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=844366.
114
115
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1. Global Harmonization and Local Application
The term “G©,” as used in this article, does not mean a supranational law that supersedes local laws. The international G©
instruments require adherence to certain common principles and
occasionally to specific legal requirements, but they also allow
some flexibility.119 Countries that have implemented TRIPS, the
WCT or a TRIPS-plus regime, have done so locally, within the
structure of their own legal systems. Local application might lead
to differences in the law among member states, but the WTO’s
unique system of dispute resolution guarantees adherence to the
minimum standards. Strong countries, however, often get away
with noncompliant statutes.120 G© thus narrows the differences
between the IP-enforcement schemes of different countries, but it
does not completely eliminate them.
Differing interpretations of the originality requirement for
copyright protection illustrate this point. As the originality
requirement was not defined by the Berne Convention, TRIPS or
the WCT, it has been left to local interpretation. The United
States, for example, emphasizes the origin of a work and requires
a tiny bit of creativity,121 while in the United Kingdom, the
originality requirement may be fulfilled by showing that labor and
skill went into the work’s creation.122 Canadian law requires that
the author exercise skill and judgment in the origination of the
work, but it leaves aside the requirement of creativity.123 Israeli
case law declares theoretical adherence to the American
interpretation of originality, but in practice, the Israeli
119 TRIPS states that “[m]embers shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and
practice.” TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 1.
120 See Okediji, supra note 7. The most striking example is the DSU’s finding that the
United States violated TRIPS by enacting the Fairness in Music Licensing Act (FIMLA), 17
U.S.C. § 110(5) (2006), which exempts small businesses such as restaurants and bars from
liability when they play the radio or television in their public venue. Panel Report, United
States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) (finding that
section 110(5)(B) violates U.S. obligations under TRIPS). For an analysis of the decision,
see Jo Oliver, Copyright in the WTO: The Panel Decision on the Three Step Test, 25 COLUM. J. L.
& ARTS 119 (2002).
The Dispute was instigated by the European Commission, following a complaint by
IMRO. Despite this finding, the United States did not amend the Copyright Act so as to
conform with the WTO decision. Rather, an arbitration procedure was initiated under
the WTO, which resulted in a finding that the annual damage to the European
Community from the U.S. lack of compliance. is 1,219,900 Euros. Award of the
Arbitrators, United States – Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, Recourse to Arbitration under
Article 25 of the DSU, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001).
121 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
122 Univ. of London Press, Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press, Ltd., [1918] 2 Ch. 601, 608-09.
123 See The Law Society of Upper Canada v. CCH Canadian Ltd., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339
(Can.). See also Yo’av Mazeh, Canadian Originality and the Tension Between the Commonwealth
and the American Standards for Copyright Protection – The Myth of Tele-Direct, 16 I.P.J. 561
(2003) (discussing Canadian originality before The Law Society of Upper Canada case).

2006]

GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, LOCAL SPEECH

519

interpretation of originality appears more closely related to the
British view.124 French law takes a completely different tactic and
requires that the work reflect the author’s personality.125 The
fundamental originality principle of copyright law is thus subject
to vastly divergent interpretations.
Another example of local flexibility within the G© regime lies
in the permitted exceptions to copyright protection. United
States copyright law enumerates several specific exceptions,126 but
it also leaves open the fair use standard, which provides for
flexibility at the expense of foreseeability and certainty.127 While
copyright law in European Union countries also allows for
exceptions, it requires these exceptions to meet a rather vague
“three step test.”128 Such allowed exceptions are: (1) limited to
special cases, (2) may not conflict with the normal exploitation of
the work, and (3) may not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interest of the right holder. This test is not new to international
copyright law.129 Although the test sounds vague, its narrow
interpretation130 stands in contrast to the broad application of the
United States fair use defense. In fact, several United States trade
partners have even questioned whether the United States fair use
doctrine complies with the three-step test.131
Doctrinal differences in copyright law across various
124 See CA 2790, 2811/93 Eisenman v. Qimron [2000], 54(3) P.D. 817. I have provided
an
unofficial
translation
of
the
Hebrew.
Dead
Sea
Scrolls,
http://lawatch.haifa.ac.il/heb/month/dead_sea.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2006).
The case addressed the controversy regarding the Dead Sea Scrolls. The court
found that a scholar who deciphered the ancient text is entitled to the copyright of the
deciphered text, even though the original author of the text is unknown, and has been
dead for at least 2000 years. For a discussion of the case and the issue of originality, see
Michael D. Birnhack, The Dead Sea Scrolls Case: Who Is an Author?, 23 E.I.P.R. 128 (2001).
125 See Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality
in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPY. SOC’Y U.S.A. 949, 968-70 (2002) (analyzing the originality
requirement in French copyright law, Gervais argues that despite the different
interpretations of the requirement of originality in various jurisdictions, there is an
emerging international consensus about the test, which is based on identifying the
creative choices made by the author).
126 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-122 (2006).
127 Id. § 107.
128 See Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167) (EC).
129 See TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 13 (echoing article 9(2) of the Berne Convention,
which was limited to exceptions to reproduction rights). TRIPS extends the three-step
test to all the rights included in the copyright bundle of rights. For discussion of the test
in general, see MARTIN R.F. SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE STEP
TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAW
(2004), and especially the discussion of TRIPS at 83-91. Thus far, only one DSU panel has
addressed the test in its ruling on 17 U.S.C. §110(5). See supra note 120.
130 See GERVAIS, supra note 54, at 144-47 (arguing that the three-step test limits the
member states’ ability to create new exceptions, such as for compulsory licenses).
131 See Ruth Okediji, Towards an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 75, 115-17 (2000)) [hereinafter Okediji, Towards an International Fair Use Doctrine]
(discussing challenges made by Australia, New Zealand, and the European Community to
the compatibility of the fair use doctrine and TRIPS article 13).
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jurisdictions may also stem from each country’s legal history. In
the United Kingdom, copyright law resulted from the shared
desire of the Crown and the Publishers’ Guild to control the
creation and dissemination of publications.132 Each party had its
own reasons for wanting control, but they joined forces, and the
result was the emergence of copyright law almost three hundred
years ago.133 The political setting was accompanied by a mixed
theory which justified copyright both as an instrument to achieve a
goal (as the 1710 Statute of Anne declared, it was an act for the
“encouragement of learning”) and as an end in itself, based on a
Lockean theory of labor. The latter also explains the United
Kingdom concept of originality, which holds that the investment
of labor is sufficient to recognize originality and award
copyright.134
The United States inherited English copyright law, but the
United States Constitution transformed it from a tool of control to
a public interest tool, intended “to promote the progress of
science.”135 This regulatory view of copyright replaced the
proprietary tones of the English law.136 Congress acknowledged
the primacy of the public over the author in the copyright
scheme,137 which resulted in a generous interpretation of the fair
use defense and the absence of moral rights at the federal level.
This preference for the public has appeared to change in recent
years, however, as copyright owners (not necessarily the authors)
have gained power and lobbied to change the laws to bring
greater benefit to themselves.138
European countries like France and Germany adopted a
different theory of copyright law, which positions the author at the
center of the discussion and seeks to protect the author’s dignity
and autonomy.139 Any benefits to the public are considered to be a
positive side effect, but these are not the direct goal of European
copyright law. To the extent that the public’s interests conflict
with those of the authors, the law contains exceptions that attempt

132 See BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 1760-1911 (1999).
133 See CPYRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY: A HISTORY 1403–1959 (1960);
LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 28 (1968).
134 The leading case on the matter is University of London Press, Ltd. v. University
Tutorial Press, Ltd.., [1916] 2 Ch. 601, 608-09.
135 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
136 See BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW (1967);
PATTERSON, supra note 133.
137 See H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909).
138 See LITMAN, supra note 53 passim.
139 See Michael D. Birnhack, Copyrighting Speech: A Trans-Atlantic View, in COPYRIGHT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 37, 50 (Paul Torremans ed., 2004) [hereinafter Birnhack, Copyrighting
Speech].
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to reconcile the conflicting interests. These exceptions, however,
are considered a compromise of the authors’ rights: they result
from the imposition of external forces and do not reflect some
inherent balance within copyright law.140 Here too, copyright law
should be located within its particular historic setting and political
background.141
Other countries have hybrid copyright laws, in terms of their
underlying goals, rationales, and the interests and rights they
purport to fulfill. The Israeli copyright law, for example, was first
introduced into the region in 1924 by the British government that
ruled Palestine under the United Nations Mandate (1917-1948).
The law that was implemented in 1924 was a modified version of
the 1911 English Copyright Act, accompanied by an ordinance,
which was a common form of primary legislation that the British
enforced in their colonies. When the State of Israel was
established in 1948, the British Acts were incorporated into Israeli
law,142 and in 1950, Israel joined Berne.143
The Copyright Act of 1911 and the Copyright Ordinance of
1924 have been amended by the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset),
but, in spite of their cumbersome language and poor translation
into Hebrew, both still remain in force and are of equal status.
Some of the amendments to the Ordinance, such as the 1989
amendment affording protection to computer programs,144 merely
reflect technological advances, but others are implementations of
international commitments. Most notable is the 1981 amendment
to the Ordinance, adding moral rights for authors.145 The
resulting law is thus a mixture of various theoretical strands, with
English law forming the basis upon which Continental ideas have

Id. at 54.
Carla Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary
France, 1777-1793, in 30 REPRESENTATIONS 109 (Robert Post ed., 1990); Jane C. Ginsburg,
A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TULANE L.
REV. 991 (1990).
142 Interestingly, although the 1991 Act was translated into Hebrew, the official
language thereof remains English. The title of the copyright act was not translated into
Hebrew until 1953, and it was written in Hebrew as the phonetic spelling of the word
“copyright.” The 1953 Amendment replaced this with the term Zchuyot Yotsrim, which
means “author’s rights,” or droit d’auteur. See Copyright Act (Amendment) of 1953, LSI 38.
This seemingly technical change reflects a deeper change towards a continental copyright
mindset.
143 See
About
WIPO:
Treaties
and
Contracting
Parties,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=972C (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
In 2003, Israel ratified the Paris Amendment to the Berne Convention. See id. In 1955,
Israel joined the Universal Copyright Convention. See Universal Copyright Convention,
http://erc.unesco.org/cp/convention.asp?KO=15381&language=E (last visited Sept. 21,
2006).
144 See § 2A of the Copyright Ordinance, 1924, 1 Hukey Eretz Israel 364, amended by
Copyright Act of 1989, LSI 300, amend. 5.
145 See § 4A of the Copyright Ordinance, 1924, as amended in 1981.
140
141
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been added. To complicate the matter further, Israeli courts
often find inspiration in and guidance from the United States law,
as the Israeli Supreme Court did when it based its interpretation
of the originality requirement on Feist.146 The Israeli Court also
read the four United States fair use factors into the English fairdealing exception, which is part of Israeli law.147 The resulting law
is an interesting, albeit messy, hybrid.148
All of the countries discussed thus far have copyright laws that
originated before the current global regime came into being. But
many countries new to copyright law, or those that changed their
laws in order to adhere to international commitments, do not
have a deep-rooted tradition of copyright law.149 Whether the lack
of tradition is due to a lag in the country’s legal system in general,
or due to the fact that copyright was never a top priority for
governments kept busy by more fundamental issues like poverty
and hunger, or whether it resulted from a socialist/communist
past, or a different conception of the creative process, this lack of
tradition has led these countries to adopt the high level of
copyright protection found in the North. The case of Indonesia,
discussed below, is one example of such a country. Many
countries joined the WTO because of the benefits it was supposed
to provide to their economies in other fields. It was only later,
when there was no turning back, that these countries found
themselves under international obligations in the IP field. While
most of these countries were not part of the negotiations leading
to the inclusion of IP rights in the WTO framework, and while few
of them have a firm legal concept of private property or
intellectual property, they are forced, in the name of
“harmonization,” to adopt the same or similar laws as countries
with vastly different histories and needs.
For certain less
developed countries, this is not just a step forward, but rather a
giant leap toward an unknown future.
The Indonesian example is telling.150 Indonesia, classified by
146 CA 513/89 Interlego A/S v. Exin-Lines Bros. SA [2001] 48(4) P.D. 133, 166
[Hebrew] (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (rejecting
“sweat of the brow” as an interpretation of the originality requirement).
147 CA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Inc., [1993] 48(1) P.D. 251 [Hebrew].
148 This is further complicated by the so-called “constitutional revolution” in Israeli law
in 1992, which declared the right to private property to be of constitutional magnitude.
Several courts stated that copyright law is intellectual property, hence property, and thus
it deserves constitutional protection. See, e.g., C.A. 6141/02 Acu”m v. I.D.F. Radio, 57(2)
P.D. 625 [2003] [Hebrew].
149 The 2006 REPORT, supra note 111, included an appendix listing “Developments in
Intellectual Property Protection” for the years 2003-2004. Examples of countries that
implemented new copyright laws or have amended their laws to fit international
commitments include (chronologically): Kazakhstan, Morocco, Algeria, Andorra, Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, and Chile.
150 See Simon Butt, Intellectual Property in Indonesia: A Problematic Legal Transplant, 24

2006]

GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, LOCAL SPEECH

523

the World Bank as a “lower-middle income economy” and
“severely indebted,”151 based its system of copyright on Dutch
copyright law, which became Indonesian law upon the
establishment of the state in 1945. Indonesia changed its laws
several times, most recently in 2003, under pressure from the
United States.152 Simon Butt, who studied the Indonesian IP
regime, reported a major gap between the law on the books and
the reality of copyright protection, which led him to describe
Indonesia (in 2002) as “an intellectual piracy haven.”153 In its 2005
Report, the USTR placed Indonesia on its Priority Watch list,154
stating that the “U.S. copyright industry estimated losses in
Indonesia of approximately $197.5 million in 2004.”
Although Indonesia has remained on the Priority Watch List
in 2006, the USTR commended it for improvements in
enforcement and instructed it on additional measures it would be
expected to undertake. This was coupled with a clear signal that
the “United States will continue to use the bilateral Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement process to work with Indonesia
to improve its IP enforcement regime.”155 Indonesia is thus
moving closer to adopting United States-inspired copyright laws,
but certain realities may prevent it from ever reaching true
harmonization with the United Sates standard.156
Another major reason for the lack of complete
harmonization of copyright laws around the world is the legal
environment that surrounds and impacts copyright law in each
individual country.157 Each country has its own body of laws, and
some of those, like antitrust law, property law, constitutional law
and free speech jurisprudence, may affect the development of
E.I.P.R. 2429 (2002).
151 See
The World Bank: Data and Statistics for Country Groups,
http://tinyurl.com/9p6kf (last visited Aug. 31, 2006).
152 See Assafa Endeshaw, Intellectual Property Enforcement in Asia: A Reality Check, 13 INT’L
J.L. & INFO. TECH. 378, 381 (2005) (quoting the Indonesian Minister of Justice
acknowledging the fear of U.S. sanctions as the motivation to enact IP legislation).
153 Id.
154 See
USTR 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 28 (MAY 2005), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_Specia
l_301/asset_upload_file195_7636.pdf.
155 See 2006 REPORT, supra note 111, at 28-29.
156 Butt lists many reasons for the failure of enforcing the IP regime in Indonesia:
increased IP protection would have little effect on Indonesians and the country’s
economy, as foreign investors are seeking stability, not IP laws; enforcement would result
in increased prices, beyond the reach of many local users, such as students in universities;
piracy is a source of employment; lack of public funding, private capital and technology
mean that IP laws are unlikely to result in local innovation; lack of reciprocity;
appropriation of traditional knowledge; and customary law which rejects Western
concepts of private property. Other reasons are inadequate police and a corrupt
judiciary. See Butt, supra note 150, at 432-37. However, as the USTR indicated in its 2006
Report, it seems that enforcement has somewhat increased. 2006 REPORT, supra note 111.
157 See TRIPS-ROUND II, supra note 10.
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copyright law. Thus, even if all countries had adopted the exact
same copyright act, there would still be divergence in the laws.
This Part has shown that, despite the attempts to harmonize
copyright law, and despite many common international core
principles, there are inherent differences in the local
interpretation and application of the law, and these differences
are unlikely to disappear in the near future. Although the road to
harmonization appears imminent, there is still a long way to go
before a unified global copyright law becomes reality, and there is
ample time to question whether this is, in fact, the appropriate
road to be taken.
In light of the differences between local copyright laws,
adherence to a common philosophical understanding behind
copyright in general might ease tensions between countries, even
if it cannot completely erase such tensions. The following Part
searches for a theoretical common ground.
2. Philosophical Justifications
Is there a coherent philosophical justification for copyright
law in the various international and global instruments? The G©
regime is a hybrid of various strands. In the spirit of the law of the
United States, G© has an instrumental undertone, but it also has
pronounced overtones of the proprietary, or natural rights, view.
In other words, it is difficult at this point to identify a singular
underlying philosophy of G©.
For example, the thin protection awarded to databases in the
international instruments reflects the United States view of
copyright law.
Both TRIPS and the WCT require that
compilations of data are protected if the “selection and
arrangement” of their contents constitute “intellectual creations,”
and they clarify that protection does not extend to the data itself.
This standard is based on the Berne Convention158 and is in line
with the United States Supreme Court’s view of copyright law, as
stated in Feist, which explicitly rejected the labor theory of
copyright law.159
Moral rights, on the other hand, reflect a Hegelian theory,
which emphasize the personal connection between an author and
his or her work.160 Moral rights usually ensure that a work is
attributed to the author and that the integrity of the work is

See Berne Convention, supra note 48, at art. 2(5).
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
See André Françon & Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors’ Rights in France: The Moral Right of the
Creator of a Commissioned Work to Compel the Commissioning Party to Complete the Work, 9
COLUM. -VLA J.L. & ARTS 381 (1985).
158
159
160
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protected. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention requires the
protection of moral rights, but this section is explicitly omitted
from TRIPS.161 The WCT, on the other hand, incorporates most
of the Berne Convention, including article 6bis.162
In some cases, the G© regime is imposed onto existing
copyright law in a country that may have already chosen one
philosophical justification, resulting in a mixture of justifications
for the law; some rules are then explained by reference to one
theory, other rules by reference to a second theory, and so on.
Furthermore, where copyright law is imposed on a country that
did not previously have copyright protection, the absence of local
legal history leaves courts and other interpreters of the law without
an important analytical and interpretive tool. The result is that
G© is void of an underlying philosophy.163
There are at least two situations in which it is important to
determine the underlying philosophy or rationale of copyright
law. The first is in common law jurisdictions, where the judiciary
has the power to interpret statutes, rather than just apply them. In
this type of system, the courts often try to understand the rationale
of the rule to be interpreted. Statutes, as written, often require
construction or explication, and in some cases, they conflict with
other legislation, or even with a country’s constitution. Hence,
interpretation is inevitable. Depending on the interpretive mode
of the country’s legal system and the extent to which the
interpretive methodology allows for an examination of more than
the strict language of the statute, the judicial analysis may include
policy considerations, legislative intent (original or otherwise),164
or legislative purpose (subjective or objective).165 Under such legal
conditions, the philosophical justification of copyright law is a
relevant factor in its interpretation.166
When there is no coherent rationale for the law, however, a
court-imposed, ex-post interpretation might explain and provide
161 See Berne Convention, supra note 48, at art. 6bis; TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 9(1).
The omission of moral rights from TRIPS was a result of U.S. objections. See GERVAIS,
supra note 54, at 124-25.
162 See WCT, supra note 90, at art. 1(4).
163 For a similar argument in regard to patent law, see Samuel Oddi, TRIPS – Natural
Rights and a ‘Polite Form of Economic Imperialism,’ 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415 (1996)
(analyzing the TRIPS articles on patents and arguing that there are some articles that can
be explained under natural rights theory, despite the pre-TRIPS instrumentalist views.
Oddi further attempts to explain other TRIPS rules based on various economic theories.
The big picture is clear: there is a theoretical mixture.).
164 Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION – FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997), with RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1985).
165 See, e.g., R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (landmark Canadian case).
See generally AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW (2005).
166 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (describing copyright’s “economic
philosophy”).
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instruction for the best application of some, but not all rules.
Until and unless a coherent theory emerges from these types of
judicial decisions, the absence of an ex-ante justification leaves the
copyright regime without philosophical roots and prevents it from
growing on solid theoretical ground. When legislation is adopted
solely due to international pressure, as in the case of IP laws in
many developing countries and LDCs, the legislation is purely
instrumental, and is enacted to serve the country’s political agenda
in its international relations. The underlying philosophical
rationale sought by the judiciary might be elusive at best or
artificial at worst.
The second situation where the underlying rationale is
relevant is where different philosophical theories may lead to
contradictory results, thus requiring a choice to be made as to
which rationale is preferable. Consider, for example, the concept
of originality, already mentioned above. Under an instrumentalist
view, the labor invested in the creation of a database is irrelevant
to the recognition of copyright. The only relevant factor is
whether recognition of copyright will promote or impede the
public interest. This type of cost-benefit analysis is only possible
under an instrumentalist view of copyright law, i.e., where
copyright is understood as a means to an end. Under a Lockean
labor theory, however, the investment of labor is sufficient
grounds for legal protection. In the 1991 Feist case, the United
States made a clear choice between the theories, and once such a
choice was made, the practical conclusion was clear.167 However,
countries lacking a solid tradition of copyright law also lack an
available rationale to inform them, when faced with the task of
adapting the law to conform to databases -- or in fact, to take into
account any new issue.
The current difficulty in identifying a coherent philosophical
justification for G© may be viewed as merely a transitional
problem, which will be resolved with some patience and time for
adjustment. This is unlikely the case, however, as the globalization
of copyright law has proven to be an ongoing process rather than
a single dramatic event. As discussed above, copyright law is
continually expanding, and the interplay between the multilateral,
bilateral and unilateral measures has created a structure that
consistently pushes for ever greater levels of copyright protection.
Thus, although it lacks a coherent underlying philosophy, G©
does serve a particular ideology: the ideology of trade.
167 The Supreme Court rejected “sweat of the brow” as the meaning of the originality
requirement, and interpreted the requirement to mean that the origin of the work is the
author, with an addition of creativity.
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3. Global Copyright as Trade
What is an ideology of trade? The WTO encapsulates this
ideology by stating that “[i]ts main function is to ensure that trade
flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.”168 A refined
question should be, therefore, what is wrong with an ideology of
trade as applied to IP?169 After all, if IP protection is needed to
provide authors and investors with sufficient incentives to produce
creative works, and if those creative works serve the public good,
then the ease with which such works can be copied across borders
is a problem that begs a solution. Without efficient, worldwide
protection of copyrighted works, the gap in the system might
widen into a destructive trap. The argument in favor of the
harmonization of copyright laws around the world, at least insofar
as they relate to trade, presents one potential solution. This is the
argument that copyright protection should be recognized across
borders and vigorously enforced, in order to prevent any one
place from becoming a piracy haven. “Free trade” in this context
does not refer to the free flow of copyrighted works across
borders, as it might in the context of goods. Rather, “free trade,”
in the context of copyright, requires the legal foundations of a
market to be created. Once these foundations, such as property
rights and contract law, are established, the market will be able to
function on its own.
G© is now administered through a trade organization, which,
as the TRIPS acronym suggests, naturally focuses on the traderelated aspects of IP.170 TRIPS does not shy away from the trade
ideology, as its preamble states: “Desiring to reduce distortions
and impediments to international trade, and taking into account
the need to promote effective and adequate protection of
intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade. . . .”171
The very inclusion of intangible property (IP) in the
framework of international trade means that IP, in a practical
sense, is equated to tangible property or goods. TRIPS has tied
the old economy to the new economy. Those countries that relied

168 WTO
in
Brief,
http://www.wto.int/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm (last visited
Sept. 21, 2006).
169 For a defense of the trade-perspective of creative works, see Alberto Bercovitz,
Copyright and Related Rights, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT 145 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
170 WIPO administers the WCT, but the current baseline of G© is TRIPS, hence the
focus thereupon.
171 TRIPS, supra note 1, at pmbl.
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upon the old economy, or that underestimated the importance of
the new economy, or that simply lacked the political power to
object, were quick to join the WTO.172 In any case, opting out of
TRIPS would have meant losing certain trade benefits, especially
the ability to export agriculture and other goods to developed
countries. Now these countries realize that it is the new economy
which is the key to development, and they realize that the price
they paid is high and, in some cases, higher than they can afford.
These countries did not realize that the limitations on the
production and use of information that they accepted in exchange
for the benefits in terms of export of goods would work against
their interests.173
The processes of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU),174 as well as the inclusion of the MFN principle in TRIPS
provide further evidence of the focus on trade.175 The MFN
principle originated in trade conventions, and until TRIPS, it was
not part of the international IP regime.176
Another aspect of TRIPS that emphasizes its trade-centered
perspective is the discretion it grants member countries to
determine the existence of exceptions to copyright protection.
Members are required to expand copyright protection, but they
are not also required to add exceptions.177 Since trade requires
the transfer of property rights to the most efficient party – the
party that can make the optimal use thereof178 -- and since trade
requires certainty, exceptions to copyright protection act against
the interest of trade. Exceptions reduce the scope of protection,
and, to the extent that they take the form of open standards,
rather than provide clarity, they create uncertainty. Narrower
exceptions mean stronger copyright protection, which serves the
trade ideology.179 Such a narrow regime of exceptions, however,
See discussion, supra Part II.C.1, especially text accompanying notes 53-64.
See the pre-TRIPS discussion in Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of
Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
243 (1989).
174 See DSU, supra note 80, at art. 22(3).
175 TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 4.
176 Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPs: Background, Principles and General Provisions, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 3, 16-17
(Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
177 TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 3(2).
178 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32 (6th ed. 2002).
179 Ruth Okediji writes:
Unlike the “trade and environment” or “trade and human rights” linkages,
however, where the explicit objective is to subject free trade to limits entailed by
specific social welfare concerns, the trade and intellectual property linkage
actually reinforces the free trade ideas as a normative absolute. The TRIPS
agreement, which is the embodiment of this linkage, contains very limited
exceptions and there is no corresponding international norm that might serve
as a counterpoise to its owner-centric, maximalist obligations.
172
173
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leaves little room for other considerations, such as the public
interest in the use of a creative work for teaching, or in the
creation of new works based on existing ones.180 The rule is,
therefore, that there is broad protection of intellectual property,
and other considerations are at best, an exception.
The shift to a trade ideology assumes the importance of
copyright law and its protection of creative works, without asking
fundamental questions about why such protection is warranted. It
focuses instead on second-order considerations. Rather than
justifying copyright in terms of a labor, instrumentalist, or
personhood theory, copyright is framed exclusively in terms of
trade.
Under the ideology of trade, copyright law represents the
ultimate commodification of creative works. If the trade ideology
requires all goods to be subject to a property regime, then the
rights of property owners are valued above all others. This means
the inclusion of more rights in the copyright bundle of rights, as
well as protection over a longer period of time and additional
“para-copyright” legal protection such as the anti-circumvention
rules prohibiting the bypassing of DRMs.181 The ideology of trade
further instructs that all goods should be alienable. Every good,
including, for the purposes of this analysis, creative works, should
be transferable, at the wish of its owners. Reducing the level of
copyright protection might limit an owner’s ability to capitalize on
the work, and limitations on trade are akin to blasphemy. The
primacy of the public interest, which was at the core of United
States copyright law, is reversed.
The primacy of the ideology of trade underlying global
copyright law has pushed aside alternative views of copyright.
Once trade is the lens through which everything must be judged,
culture loses its importance. Under the trade ideology, culture
might be relevant to the extent that it can be commodified or
commercialized, but it is no longer a factor to be considered on its
own. The ideology of trade recognizes and promotes one factor
only: the free global market. The shift to a commodified culture
Okediji, Towards an International Fair Use Doctrine, supra note 131, at 84-95 (footnotes
omitted).
180 For the role of users in copyright law, see generally L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W.
LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT, A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS (1991); Julie E. Cohen,
The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005).
181 See, e.g., WCT, supra note 90, at art. 11; DMCA, supra note 91 (which added chapter
12 to the Copyright Act). Although these rules are technically part of the U.S. Copyright
Act, their subject matter is not the work of authorship, but rather the technological
measures applied by the copyright owners to protect their works; hence it is only an
indirect, ancillary protection. The term “para-copyright” was first used in a letter written
by copyright law professors to Congress, which was quoted in the congressional hearing.
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24 (1998).
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has a cost to our freedom, which is imposed on the global
audience of users (or consumers, if one insists on trade-related
language). The cost is difficult to quantify, but, as the next Part
will show, it includes the cost of losing freedom of speech. This
cost, like the gains of G©, is spread unevenly.
III.
TRADITIONS OF FREE SPEECH
It is a well-known fact that different countries provide
different levels of protection to speech. A country’s free speech
jurisprudence is the result of several factors, such as the country’s
history, culture, and political and legal systems. In addition to
observing the diversity of speech regimes by exploring certain
examples thereof, this article argues that the speech regime is
local in nature, rather than global, and that the “free speech
regime” has remained local, despite attempts to establish a global
principle of freedom of expression. Because of the culturally and
politically contingent nature of free speech jurisprudence, such
efforts at globalization are unlikely to succeed, although traderelated speech may represent an exception to the localization of
freedom of speech laws.182
A. Global Speech?
There have been many efforts to globalize freedom of
expression through the use of international legal instruments.
Chief among them is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948.
Article 19 thereof states, “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression: this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers.”183
Members of the United Nations are not bound by the
Declaration, but it has nonetheless had a tremendous and
182 Trademark law, for example, is part of globalization. Another exception is hate
speech: as more countries find themselves under terrorist threats, they join hands in
fighting terrorism. Hate speech is sometimes affiliated with terrorism. See, e.g., Council of
Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention On Cybercrime, Concerning the
Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through
Computer
Systems,
Jan.
28,
2003,
E.T.S.
no.
189,
available
at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/189.htm.
183 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 19, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration
of Human Rights]. For the history of the drafting of this article, see Juhani Kortteinen,
Kristian Myntti & Lauri Hannikainen, Article 19, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS – A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 393, 401 (Gudmundur
Alfredsson & Asbjorn Eide eds., 1999) [hereinafter A COMMON STANDARD OF
ACHIEVEMENT].
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worldwide impact. In 1948, forty-eight of the fifty-eight United
Nations member states adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and many additional countries have since announced their
The Universal Declaration has been
commitment thereto.184
expressly referred to in many constitutions, and it has inspired
many more.185 It has had a far-reaching effect on the legal
construction and interpretation of the concept of human rights.
One commentator noted that it “exerts a moral, political, and
legal influence far beyond the hopes of many of its drafters.”186 It
is considered today to be “the primary source of global human
rights standards,”187 and it is an important source of customary
international law.188
Although article 19 is stated as if the enumerated rights are
absolute rights, no country applies them as absolute commands.
Even the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,
despite its strong language, was not interpreted as an absolute.189
Furthermore, article 29 of the Universal Declaration allows
limitations of the right, “[f]or the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and
of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the
general welfare in a democratic society.”190 The 1996 Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa, which is considered to be one of
the most progressive constitutions in the world today, provides a
clear illustration of this non-absolute nature of the right to free
speech.191 The South African Constitution first announces the
right to freedom of expression in a broad manner (“everyone has
the right to freedom of expression”), then enumerates some
concrete derivatives of this right, such as the freedom of the press
or the freedom to receive information. The Constitution then
goes on to limit and exclude some forms of expression, such as
propaganda for war, incitement of immediate violence, and
184 Due to its non-binding nature, the Declaration does not have a signatory system and
hence there is no authoritative list of countries which adhere thereto.
185 See Hurst Hannum, The Status and Future of the Customary International Law of Human
Rights: The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International
Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 289 (1996) (surveying the influence of the
Declaration worldwide).
186 Id.
187 Id. at 291.
188 Id. passim.
189 U.S. CONST. amend. I. For an absolutist interpretation thereof, see Justice Black’s
dissenting opinion in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952). See also Edmond
Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment “Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549,
559 (1962).
190 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 183, at art. 29. See Torkel
Opsahl & Vojin Dimitrijevic, Article 29 and 30, in A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT,
supra note 183, at 633.
191 S. AFR. CONST. 1996.
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advocacy of hatred. However, the South African Constitution
limits the right not only in this category-based manner, but in
another way, that of balancing, which reflects article 29 of the
Universal Declaration. Section 36 of the South African Constitution
states that
The rights in the Bill of Rights [including the freedom of
expression] may be limited only in terms of law of general
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant
192
factors.

The section then lists five such factors with regard to the
limitation of certain rights: the nature of the right, the importance
of the limitation, the extent of the limitation, the relation between
the limitation and its purpose, and the least restrictive means to
193
achieve the purpose.
Other major international covenants convey a similar
message, that free speech can be balanced against conflicting
interests. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of
1966 states:
19.2 Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;
this right shall include the freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.
19.3 The exercise of the right provided for in paragraph 2 of
this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It
may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
1. For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
2. For the protection of national security or of public order
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.194

Unlike the Universal Declaration, this definition of the right to
free speech acknowledges that speech is not an absolute right.
The International Covenant allows for the limitation of freedom of
speech in two situations. The first situation exists at the
“horizontal” level, or the private sphere, where the conflict is
between two private parties. If one person’s speech might harm
another’s reputation, privacy or other interests (such as
copyright), then that speech may be restricted.

Id. § 36.
Id.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), at 55,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496 plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).
192
193
194
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The second situation in which free speech can be limited
under the International Covenant is at the “vertical” level, where the
conflict is between the state and a citizen due to a state-imposed
limitation on the speech of an individual. A restriction on speech
in the interest of national security is the chief example of such a
limitation, but the Covenant also lists other situations in which
restrictions on free speech are permitted -- the protection of
public order, public health, or public morals. Limitations on
speech are thus permitted only if two conditions are met: (1) that
the restriction is by law, and (2) that it is necessary. For those
states that wish to limit free speech, these vague conditions can be
easily satisfied. The result is that the International Covenant
provides a statement that is important for its political, educational,
and moral power, but that is practically weak and can be easily
bypassed.
Other global or international initiatives are more specific.
The Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, for example,
declares that, “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression”
and enumerates the elements of this right (freedom to hold
opinions, and to receive and impart information without
governmental interference and across borders), but also subjects
the right to limitations if some strict conditions are met.195
The focus of the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages (1992) of the Council of Europe is even more specific.
The Charter strives to guarantee the freedom of direct reception
of broadcast across political borders, and to ensure that “no
restrictions [are] placed on freedom of expression and free
circulation of information in the written press in a language used
in identical or similar form to a regional or minority language.”196
A more recent legal instrument touching on speech rights is
the Civil Society Declaration on Shaping Information Societies for
Human Needs.197 This Declaration was adopted in December, 2003,
by the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which
convened
under
the
auspices
of
the
International
195 See Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310)
at
arts.
II-72,
II-112,
available
at
http://www.europa.eu.int/constitution/en/lstoc1_en.htm. The Treaty is not yet in force,
as at least two European Union Members (France and the Netherlands) have rejected its
text. For the current state of the treaty, see Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe, http://europa.eu/constitution/referendum_en.htm (last visited
Sept. 21, 2006).
196 See European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, June 5, 1992, 2044
U.N.T.S.
577,
at
art.
11.2,
available
at
http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en/ Treaties/Html/148.htm.
197 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), Shaping Information Societies
for Human Needs: Civil Society Declaration to the World Summit on the Information
Society, Dec. 8, 2003, http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/civil-society-declaration.pdf.
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Telecommunication Union (ITU), and focused on the digital
environment. The Civil Society Declaration is fascinating in that it
is, in many respects, far removed from the agenda of the North, or
more precisely, from the interests of many global megacorporations.198 In the context of copyright, for example, the
Declaration states that “[e]xisting international copyright
regulation instruments including TRIPS and WIPO should be
reviewed to ensure that they promote cultural, linguistic and
media diversity and contribute to the development of human
knowledge.”199 The Declaration also explicitly refers to article 19
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and enumerates the
rights to media, access, and speech that derive therefrom,
especially in the context of the Internet.200 These commitments
were reaffirmed in the second WSIS summit in Tunis, in
November, 2005.201
B. Balancing Speech with Local Interests
The international attempts at the pronouncement of a global
free speech principle are composed of two elements: a (global)
rule and (local) exceptions. This “rule and exception” structure
provides for the balancing of conflicting rights and interests.
While balancing was rejected by United States constitutional law as
an invalid methodology,202 it is very much alive elsewhere.203
Balancing free speech with conflicting rights and interests
requires recognizing that the right to free speech is not absolute.
Importantly, the fact that speech is balanced against other rights
and interests does not, in itself, dictate the outcome of the
balancing test. The result of the constitutional methodology of
balancing depends on the weight accorded to each of the
conflicting interests or rights and the way the balance is structured
to begin with and then upon the way it is applied.
How should the balancing formula be constructed? Which
198 The divergence of the WSIS from the politics of the North and the agenda of the
mega-corporations is apparent throughout the Declaration, for example, in its call to
promote free software. Id. § 2.3.3.3 ¶ 2.
199 Id. § 2.3.1.3.
200 Id. §§ 2.1.5, 2.2.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3.
201 See WSIS, Tunis Commitment, WSIS Doc. No. WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/7-E (Nov. 18,
2005), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/7.html.
202 For a discussion of balancing in the United States, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943 (1986). Perhaps “balancing”
acquired a negative reputation in the United States due to “ad hoc balancing.” A less
objectionable type of balancing is what Melville Nimmer called “definitional balancing.”
Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192-93 (1970).
203 For a comprehensive statement on balancing, see Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging:
The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 93–97 (2002) (outlining
the constitutional methodology of balancing).
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interests are worthy of being balanced against the right to free
speech? There are various examples around the globe, including
the South African constitution, discussed above. Likewise, the
Canadian Charter instructs that the rights and freedoms set therein
can be subject “only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”204
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) states in
article 10(2) that freedom of expression can be
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.205

The ECHR thus lists both the interests that may supersede
freedom of expression and the general formula for balancing
them against one another. European Courts added that the
restriction on speech should be proportional to the legitimate aim
pursued.206
Other jurisdictions have adopted their own balancing
formulas, and it is these formulas that create a space for local
considerations. A country must decide for itself how to serve its
national security interests, how to ensure the public order, and
how to define its morals. And a country must determine the
weight it accords to these conflicting interests. These decisions
are political in nature and may be fiercely disputed within a
country. Chief Justice Shimon Agrant stated in one of Israel’s
most important constitutional free speech opinions that “[i]t is a
well known axiom that the law of a people must be studied in the
light of its national way of life.”207 A critical example of the need
for balancing is demonstrated in the case of changing national
security interests: indeed, when new threats materialize and
threaten the security of a country, the law must respond to such
204 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), available at
http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/index.html. See also R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103
(Can.) (containing a discussion on the subject).
205 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm.
206 See, e.g., Jason Coppel & Michael Supperstone, Judicial Review after the Human Rights
Act, 3 E.H.R.L. REV. 301, 312 (1999).
207 HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am Co. v. Minister of the Interior [1953] IsrSC 7(2) 871, 884,
translated in 1 Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 90, 105 (E. David
Goitein ed., 1953).
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changing needs.208
If free speech jurisprudence revolves around national
interests and local political decisions, the reason for its focus on
the governmental paradigm becomes clear.
Because
governmental interests are accorded more weight than private
interests, a country’s free speech jurisprudence will be shaped first
and foremost by the threats to free speech that come from
governmental, rather than market forces. The horizontal level of
the private sphere remains secondary, but this does not mean that
the horizontal level lacks value judgments. On the contrary,
formulating a definitional balance between free speech and other
human rights, such as the right to privacy, reputation, or property,
does indeed reflect the values of the community. What comprises
a person’s reputation? What is the scope of privacy? Is property
more important than free speech? These are deeply political
decisions, contingent upon elusive factors such as society, culture,
and a people’s “national way of life.”209
The annual report on freedom of the press by Freedom
House confirms these intuitions about the status of free speech
around the world.210 While a free press is only one aspect of free
speech, the Freedom House reports provide the most
comprehensive survey on the status of speech. Given the focus on
the press, the reports examine restrictions on speech at primarily
the vertical level. The reports rate the degree of freedom based
on the legal environment in which the media operates and the
amount of political influence over reporting and access to
information.
The reports also examine restrictions at the
horizontal level by taking into account economic pressures on
content.211 The most recent report concluded that in 2004, “out of
194 countries and territories surveyed, 75 countries (39%) were
rated Free, 50%) were rated Partly Free, and 69 (35%) were rated
208 This is true of the United States as well. See, e.g., the post-World War I speech cases,
such as Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), and the congressional response to
9/11, in the form of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§
105, 201-02, 204, 212, 214, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
209 Kol Ha’am, 7(2) P.D. at 884. See Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Migration and the
Bounds of Comparative Analysis, 58 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 67, 77 (2001) (providing an
interesting example of the different social and value choices of the United States and
Canada: whereas the latter is “committed to multiculturalism and group-regarding
quality,” the United States emphasizes “individualism and an assimilationist ideal”; and
arguing that these social and normative differences explain the difference in
constitutional jurisprudence on hate speech).
210 Freedom House is a non-governmental organization.
Freedom House,
http://www.freedomhouse.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
211 See
Karin
Deutsch
Karlekar,
Press
Freedom
in
2004,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=131&year=2005 (last visited Aug. 22,
2006).
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Not Free.”212 This report will be referred to further in the
following Part.
Free speech jurisprudence thus remains local in nature and
reflects the different ideologies, politics, and cultural choices of
each jurisdiction.
The processes of globalization, however
powerful, are unlikely to render these differences obsolete.
C. Free Speech and Free Trade
What then, is the relationship between free speech and free
trade? If a country adopts a free trade policy, will it become
(more) democratic? A comparison of WTO members at varying
stages of development with the list generated by the Freedom
House report confirms the intuition that there is a strong
correlation between free speech and free trade. First, the list of
WTO members (as of July, 2006) was divided into three categories,
applying the “globalization” terminology of developed-developingleast developed countries. Second, this list was compared with the
list generated by Freedom House.213 The results are as follows:
Of the fifty LDCs, thirty-two are WTO members. Only three
are classified by Freedom House as “Free,”214 eleven are classified
as “Partly Free,”215 and eighteen are classified as “Not Free.”216
Id.
A few short methodological notes are in order. As mentioned supra note 34, the
United Nations publishes a list of LDCs, but not of developed or developing countries.
The WTO relies on the U.N.’s LDC list, but enables each remaining country to choose for
itself its status as a developed or developing country. See Who Are the Developing
Countries in the WTO?, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
The comparison that follows in the text focused on the 149 countries currently
members of the WTO. The category of developed countries was composed according to
the World Bank’s list of twenty-four High Income Countries, which is derivative of the list
of thirty members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). The World Bank’s list is available at The World Bank, Data and Statistics
(2006), http://tinyurl.com/ane6m, and the OECD’s list is available at OECD, Member
Countries, http://tinyurl.com/2jksv (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
The shorter list of the World Bank’s High Income list includes: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, South
Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. The six countries which
are OECD members but not on the World Bank list are the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Mexico, Poland, The Slovak Republic and Turkey. All thirty OECD countries are WTO
members. The remainder of the two lists (of developed countries and LDCs) were
classified as developing countries. Some of these developing countries are defined by the
World Bank as “high income economies,” but are either not members of the OECD or are
not on the twenty-four “high income” list. Examples are Israel, Singapore and the United
Arab Emirates. For the full list, see The World Bank, Data & Statistics (2006),
http://tinyurl.com/9p6kf.
The other classification of countries listed according to their level of freedom of
speech was composed according to the 2004 report of Freedom House (published in late
2005), taking freedom of the press to be a proxy for freedom of speech in general.
214 Benin, Mali and Solomon Islands.
215 Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Uganda.
212
213
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Of the developing countries,217 the division is as follows: thirtyone countries are “Free,”218 twenty-eight countries are “Partly
Free,”219 and twenty-seven are “Not Free.”220
Of the twenty-four developed countries, all but two (Norway
and Italy, which were classified as Partly Free) are classified by
Freedom House as “Free countries.” Of the additional six OECD
members that are not considered High Income countries, four
were classified as “Free,” and two (Mexico and Turkey) as “Partly
Free.” None of the developed countries was classified as “Not
Free.”
The correlation between free trade and free speech does not
necessarily mean that there is a causal link between the two.
However, for the purpose of the argument that follows, causation
does not matter. If, on the one hand, as many in the North
believe, free trade promotes, in the long term, a more democratic
form of government, which includes free speech,221 then one
should not ignore any impediment to the goal of achieving freespeech. To the extent that copyright law is such an impediment,
the conflict between free speech and copyright law should be
addressed. If, on the other hand, there is no causal link between
free trade and freedom in general, then imposing a trade-oriented
copyright law onto countries that lack free speech will only serve
to reduce freedom of speech without bringing the long-term
benefits of democracy. In other words, free trade might mean
freedom of some to conduct business, but it does not necessarily
mean freedom of speech.222
216 Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Maldives, Mauritania,
Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Rwanda, Togo, Zambia.
217 Macao is listed as an independent member of the WTO, but is not independently
classified by Freedom House. Rather, it is listed as Macao (China). For this reason, it is
left out of the analysis here.
218 Estonia, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji,
Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Hong Kong, Israel, Jamaica, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Latvia,
Malta, Mauritius, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Slovenia, South Africa, Suriname, Taiwan (Chinese Taipei),
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay.
219 Albania, Antigua, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Congo, Croatia, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kuwait,
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, Thailand.
220 Armenia, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Cameron, China, Columbia, Côte d’Ivoire,
Cuba, Egypt, Gabon, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Moldova, Morocco, North
Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Swaziland, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
221 The classic arguments remain those of FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM (1944) and MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
222 Fredrich Jameson writes that:
It is in particular important ironically to distance the rhetoric of freedom – not
merely free trade, but free speech, the free passage of ideas and intellectual
“properties” – which accompany this [U.S. GATT cultural] policy . . . . The
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Equipped with the understanding that speech and its legal
protection are local in nature, combined with previous
conclusions about the nature of G©, the copyright law/free
speech conflict comes into focus. The comparison of free trade
and free speech will demonstrate that G© serves the free trade
interests of the North, and disserves the free speech interests of
the South.
IV.
COPYRIGHT AND SPEECH
Is there a conflict between copyright law and free speech?
The conflict is readily apparent to some, but to others, especially
courts, the conflict does not exist.223 The existence of a conflict
between copyright law and free speech does not run through every
element of copyright law, nor does it mean that copyright law is
inherently unconstitutional.
Acknowledging the conflict,
however, does require an awareness of the ways in which the
exceptions to copyright protection resolve the free speech
considerations, and it also requires an interpretation of copyright
law that does not run afoul of free speech principles.
This Part will first survey the conflict argument and the
various judicial responses thereto. It will also point to the
weaknesses of these responses. The discussion focuses on single
jurisdictions before returning to the global arena. The second
section will “go global” by examining the conflict between G© and
the local traditions of free speech.
A. Is There a Conflict?
The response to the conflict argument, first raised thirty-six
years ago in the United States, has developed and changed over
the years. The initial response was simply that there is no
conflict,224 suggesting that speech and copyright are completely
separate and unrelated legal concepts. Later, the refusal to
recognize a conflict between free speech and copyright was based
on historical and constitutional reasoning: the framers saw no
conflict, as the IP clause and the First Amendment live side by
side.225

freedom of those corporations (and their dominant nation-state) is scarcely the
same thing as our individual freedom as citizens.
Fredrich Jameson, Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue, in THE CULTURE OF
GLOBALIZATION 54, 60 (Fredrich Jameson & Masao Miyoshi eds., 1998).
223 In a previous work I argued that there is such a conflict, and that the judicial refusal
to acknowledge it amounts to a denial thereof. See Michael D. Birnhack, The Copyright Law
and Free Speech Affair: Making-Up and Breaking-Up, 43 IDEA: J. OF L. & TECH. 233 (2003).
224 Id. at 248-53.
225 Id. at 254-60.
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These reasons, however, failed to convince scholars and
lawyers, who continued to argue that there is a conflict between
free speech and copyright law, and consequently, another more
substantial response emerged from the American judiciary.
Courts reasoned that both copyright law and free speech
principles share the same goal, that of promoting speech. Each
legal field simply applies different means toward the same end.
Copyright law aims at the market by providing incentives to
authors to make works and acts as a substitute for governmental
intervention in the creative process.
Conversely, the First
Amendment aims at the government and prevents it from limiting
speech. Hence, there is no conflict, but rather, a beneficial
cooperation between the two areas of law. This has been called
the shared goal argument,226 and is best encapsulated in Justice
O’Connor’s 1985 judicial sound bite: “In our haste to disseminate
news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”227 Since then,
both legal fields have expanded to such an extent that, even if
there were no conflict between free speech and copyright at the
time, there is one now.228
The shared goal argument tells a story in which there is a
division of labor between copyright and freedom of speech. The
shared goal argument thus assumes that copyright and freedom of
speech occupy entirely separate realms of influence. The shared
goal argument further refuses to accept the fact that copyright law
itself is a governmental act and should be subject to judicial
scrutiny.
The principal response to the shared goal argument was that
Congress had already taken into consideration free speech
concerns in copyright law, and had built into the copyright laws
certain mechanisms to resolve any potential problems.229 The
main “free speech ambassadors” within copyright law are the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense.230 According
to this response to the shared goal argument, the idea/expression
dichotomy excludes ideas from copyright law, and hence enables
the marketplace of ideas to operate without interference, and the
fair use defense allows a breathing space for speech, in that it

Id. at 266.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1, 12-30, 30-36 (2001) (surveying copyright law and First Amendment developments,
respectively, since 1970).
229 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (stating that the built-in
safeguards within copyright law are generally adequate to address free speech concerns.)
230 Birnhack, supra note 223, at 278-82.
226
227
228
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exempts criticism and other expressive activities.
The study of the conflict argument and the judicial response
thereto reveals that there are, in fact, two conflicts at stake, and
they are often confused.231 One conflict exists at the constitutional
level, where one clause of the Constitution (the “promote the
progress” clause)232 empowers Congress to enact copyright laws,
and another (the First Amendment) prohibits the limitation of
speech. This conflict is called the external conflict.233 The other
conflict is the internal conflict, which exists within copyright law
and represents the fundamental tension upon which copyright law
is built. Copyright law must address the conflicting interests of the
author and of the public; it must serve the goal of encouraging
creativity and the dissemination of creative works, but it must do
so by placing control over those creative works in the hands of
property owners, who may then prevent those works from being
used as building blocks for new creativity. It is also a conflict
between the long term goal of promoting creativity by providing
incentives to make works of authorship and the short term means
to achieve such incentives by limiting the access to, and the use of
those works.234 The observation that there are in fact two conflicts,
as opposed to just one, leads to a further observation. While users
of copyrighted works advancing a conflict argument often pointed
to the external conflict, the judicial response, which was to deny
the conflict, did so by referring to the internal conflict, stating that
the conflict had been solved at the internal level. This kind of
response, addressing the external conflict in terms of the internal
conflict, may be called the internalization of the conflict
argument.
There are two ways in which the response to the conflict
argument is internalized.235 The first is substantive internalization,
whereby the conflict argument is rejected on a philosophical (and
historical) level. This type of internalization must, therefore,
assume a specific justification of copyright law, as only under the
instrumental view, where copyright is understood to have a goal,
can one say that the goal of copyright law is shared by free speech
jurisprudence. This response also assumes a particular kind of
free speech philosophy, one that has a goal (and is not an end in

231 Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech after Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1275 (2003).
232 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 8.
233 Birnhack, supra note 231, at 1304-05.
234 Yochai Benkler describes this temporal tension in economic terms, as one between
static and dynamic efficiency. Yochai Benkler, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS – HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 36-37 (2006).
235 Birnhack, supra note 231, at 1305-09.
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itself), and this goal needs to be one that fits the goal of copyright
law.236
The other form of internalization of the conflict argument is
the mechanical internalization, where some copyright law
mechanisms are designated to play a role in mitigating the
conflict.237 This form of internalization, in turn, assumes a division
of labor between Congress and the judiciary, a division that, in
light of judicial review, might be fallacious. The mechanical
internalization should furthermore force courts to interpret
copyright law in such a way that enables the internal copyright
mechanisms to truly fulfill their constitutional tasks. This is
especially so with regard to the fair use defense: it should be
interpreted broadly and vigorously as to reflect its task of
representing the First Amendment within copyright law.
In Eldred, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998
(CTEA).238 The Court rejected the arguments against the Act,
including a First Amendment challenge. Justice Ginsburg first
discussed the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense,
both referred to as “built-in First Amendment accommodations,”239
and then concluded that “[t]o the extent such assertions raise
First Amendment concerns, copyright’s built-in free speech
safeguards are generally adequate to address them.”240 The Court
thus injected fresh constitutional rationale into the fair use
doctrine, which previously had been justified solely on bases
internal to copyright law.241 This means that even if the conflict
between them is denied, free speech principles do have an effect
on the way copyright law is constructed and interpreted in the
United States. Thus, copyright law and free speech have reached
an uneasy sort of co-existence in the United States. The
equilibrium might change over the course of the years, as
copyright law and First Amendment jurisprudence evolve, but
nevertheless, the tension is present.
This discussion of the internal and external conflicts and
substantive versus mechanical internalization aids in the
236 For a detailed account of this argument, see Michael D. Birnhack, More or Better?
Shaping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 59 (P. Bernt
Hugenholtz & Lucie Guibault eds., 2005) (discussing the compatibility of copyright law
justifications and free speech justifications).
237 Birnhack, supra note 231, at 1306.
238 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
239 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003).
240 See id. at 219. See also Birnhack, supra note 231, at 1292, 1308.
241 See the ground-breaking work of Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600 (1982).
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understanding of the different responses to the conflict argument
in the United States judiciary and that of other jurisdictions,
especially the European Union and the United Kingdom.242 The
constitutional backdrop of the latter jurisdictions explicitly
permits the balancing of free speech considerations with other
rights and interests, and thus, the harm caused to freedom of
expression by copyright law is understood there differently than it
is in the United States. The prevalent understanding of copyright,
which focuses on the individual author as opposed to the public,
renders the shared goal argument irrelevant on the Continent.
The result is that the conflict argument remains on the external,
constitutional level, and the response is in the form of mechanical,
not substantive internalization.243
In short, the theory behind copyright law matters. It matters
not only in terms of the interpretation and application of
copyright law, but also for other reasons, namely the protection of
free speech. Copyright law grants owners control over their works.
The creative process requires building on previous works, which
requires access to such works and the ability to borrow ideas and
facts (which, of course, are not protected by copyright law), as well
as the freedom to use the expressive parts of the existing works to
create new works. The freedom to use and reuse works is
necessary to the creative process, but it also has a constitutional
relevance, in that it enables the exercise of free speech. When
speakers are limited in the way they can express themselves – even
if the limitation stems from market, not governmental forces, and
even if the limitation is justified – their speech rights are limited.
Such limitation requires an explanation. Accordingly, the various
judicial responses to the conflict argument might be accepted if
they also serve to inform the interpretation and application of
exceptions and defenses to copyright. However, in order for the
effects on speech to be taken seriously within copyright law, the
conflict must first be acknowledged.
B. Global Conflict
This article has shown that copyright law has become global
and that the only ideology behind G© is that of trade. How does
the conflict argument play out under such circumstances? Is there
an external conflict between copyright law and free speech, an
internal conflict within copyright law, or perhaps both? Can a
242 For a discussion of the conflict argument in the United Kingdom, see Michael D.
Birnhack, Acknowledging the Conflict Between Copyright Law and Freedom of Expression Under the
Human Rights Act, 23 ENT. L. REV. 24 (2003).
243 See Birnhack, Copyrighting Speech, supra note 139.
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meaningful internalization of the conflict take place in countries
which lack a strong tradition of free speech or which have been
affected by G©?
The external conflict, as defined earlier, is one between two
separate fields of law: copyright law on the one hand, and free
speech jurisprudence on the other. Once an external conflict is
identified, one may resolve the conflict through substantive
internalization or mechanical internalization; but each method of
resolution has consequences. Copyright law and free speech have
reached a balance on the local level in some jurisdictions. To the
extent that there is a clash between the two legal fields in the
United States, for example, the response that copyright enables
freedom of expression is partially convincing. Now copyright law
is exported from the North to the South, without the parallel
export of free speech jurisprudence. Since it takes two for a
conflict, one cannot frame the problem as a conflict, let alone
devise means to solve it. The balance of the North is inapplicable
in the South.
Some of the developing and less developed countries do have
some local free speech law, and they might have already reached
equilibrium in the copyright/speech conflict. However, now one
side of the balance (copyright law) has changed, and the other
(local free speech law) has remained unchanged. While countries
with a solid free speech principle may be able to reach a balance
with copyright law, most of those countries already have a strong
copyright law, which is compatible with G© and its free trade
ideology. For those countries that lack any meaningful tradition
of free speech, however, the lack of a viable counter-measure to
copyright law is the least of their democratic deficiencies. Local
law is thus not likely to have an impact on the copyright-speech
conflict at the global level.
For the fifty-five countries classified as “developing countries”
and rated either as “Not Free” or as “Partially Free” by Freedom
House, the price of G© matters the most. These countries do not
have the local strength to ease the pressure of copyright law, and
the imposition of G© void of philosophical justification might well
result in a clash between the global and the local. This is the clash
between copyright law and freedom of speech, between a
consequentialist trade ideology and deontological human rights
theory.244
It is in these “Not Free” or “Partially Free” developing
244 For a conceptualization of the trade/human rights conflict in general, along the
lines of consequentialist and deontological theories, see Frank J. Garcia, Trading Away the
Human Rights Principle, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 51 (1999).

2006]

GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, LOCAL SPEECH

545

countries that GloCalization is likely to emerge. Courts faced with
a free speech/copyright conflict can either imitate the United
States response, which would mean ignoring the local nature of
free speech jurisprudence, or they can turn to local free speech
law for a solution, to the extent that it is available. The local laws
may not manage to overcome the conflict, but they can serve to
mitigate the effects of G©. This reliance on the local free speech
jurisprudence may result in a more reasonable application of
copyright law, and a less proprietary, more civilized regime. It can
protect genuine national interests, like education, access to
knowledge, and the preservation of language, culture and other
social norms. Reliance on the local jurisprudence can thus serve
to soften the aggressive nature of the global.
In order for this to happen, however, a developing country
must acknowledge the anti-speech potential of copyright law,
understand that it requires a response, and be able to withstand
the political pressure flowing from the North, which demands
adherence to G©. Copyright law might inspire a country’s
creativity and foster the growth of knowledge and science, and
globalization might ultimately promote local industries and
encourage foreign investors. But until the positive benefits can be
felt, a country must make the transition from local to global, and
its citizens must have access to information, to knowledge and to
global culture.
Furthermore, the goal of copyright law must be recognized
even in those countries which do have viable local free speech
jurisprudence, in order for the shared goal argument to make any
sense. It might be that the “Framers [of the U.S. Constitution]
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression,”245
but the framers of G© had no such intentions. G© is void of any
ideology other than that of trade; G© has no embedded values
that converge or overlap with those of free speech; and absent any
common ground, the shared goal argument and the substantive
internalization both collapse.
For many jurisdictions, therefore, it does not make sense to
speak of an external conflict, and, even if there is such a conflict, it
cannot be internalized on any philosophical level. Accordingly,
one turns to the internal level. Perhaps G© can carry with it some
internal mechanisms to ease the tension.
Can internal
mechanisms “take care” of free speech concerns when copyright
law is dictated to and imposed upon countries without
consideration for their history and culture?
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The primary internal mechanisms within copyright law that
can act as ambassadors of free speech are the idea/expression
dichotomy and exceptions to copyright protection, such as the
United States’ fair use doctrine. However, these mechanisms are
absent from the global instruments, or worse, they are relegated to
a secondary position.246 The bilateral agreements likewise do not
carve out exceptions, and it remains to be seen whether the
unilateral measures will include them or not (however, the
USTR’s annual 301 Report has yet to require a country to create
broader exceptions to copyright).247 Countries new to copyright
law, or those that adjust their copyright law to fit G©, are not
equipped with sufficient internal mechanisms to accommodate
free speech concerns. Hence, when G© is imposed on these
countries, it is not a balanced copyright law. The price of G© will
be paid, inter alia, in the currency of free speech.
Global copyright does not, and can not, take care of the
conflict between copyright and free speech in any meaningful
manner.
V.
CONCLUSION
This article began by observing globalization and the
social/political phenomenon of GloCalization, the social space in
which the global meets the local. GloCalization can either be
viewed as a battlefield in which cultures are pitted against political
power, or it can be a space of productive interaction. Turning to
intellectual property and copyright law, and placing it within the
general framework of globalization, global copyright was found to
be detached from its philosophical justifications and understood,
unfortunately, solely in the context of one ideology: free trade.
While copyright has become global, free speech jurisprudence has
remained local in nature. The “law of expressions” around the
world varies and depends on the history of the nation, its general
culture and its legal culture.
Examining the alleged conflict between copyright and free
speech, this article revealed that there are actually two conflicts at
stake: one at the constitutional level, external to copyright law;
and the other within copyright law itself. The common responses
to the conflict (substantive internalization, or the “shared goal
argument,” and mechanical internalization, or the reliance on
free-speech safeguards built in to copyright law) suggest a new
level of understanding the copyright-free speech conflict as a
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GloCalization problem: global copyright law conflicts with local
free speech traditions.
There are several (political) lessons to be taken from this
endeavor. One is addressed to the North: exporting G© and
imposing it onto unwilling recipient countries has a price in terms
of free speech. Indeed, as shown, many of the countries whose
copyright law is based on the G© regime lack satisfactory freedom
of speech. Almost ironically, however, a balanced form of
copyright law can assist in spreading not only trade but freedom as
well. Acknowledging the free speech implications of copyright law
is a first step in resolving the problem. Being tolerant to processes
of GloCalization is a second important step. When the North
suggests that the new copyright regimes will serve the countries
upon which it is imposed, it is important to remember the conflict
and to insist that copyright be accompanied with viable free
speech laws. Imagine the North bundling copyright with speech
and tying the level of copyright protection accorded to a country
to the strength of its free speech jurisprudence. In this way, G©
would truly achieve the promises of globalization. It is important
to understand that the global cannot replace the local overnight; a
dialectic process of reconciliation between the two spheres should
be expected.
As for the lesson to be learned by global institutions, this
article has shown that focusing on trade alone may have grave
unintended consequences. A truly free (global) trade will benefit
not only from unified trade laws, but from stronger democracies
and better protection of human rights. If access to knowledge is
assured in a free environment, in which one can reuse creative
works to create new knowledge, then copyright law can indeed
serve as an engine of global progress, of science and of free
speech.

